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ARTICLES

The Battle Over the Rewrite of Illinois'
Telecommunications Law: Is More

Reform Needed?
JAMES M. FINK*

INTRODUCTION

On May 15, 1992, the section of the Illinois Public Utilities Act'
("Act") dealing with telecommunications regulation expires. 2 The
Illinois General Assembly will either have to renew the current telecommunications law as is, or modify it. The imminent rewrite of the
telecommunications law has created a great deal of controversy. The
Illinois Commerce Commission ("Commission") and local telephone
companies want the law changed while most consumer groups want
the law to remain the same. Under the current law, telephone companies are regulated by means of "rate-of-return" regulation. The
Commission determines the reasonable cost incurred by telephone
companies in providing individual telecommunications services and
then sets individual service rates at a level which gives the telephone
companies a reasonable return on their investment. 3
*

Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Chicago Office); B.A.

Yale University 1985, M.P.P. Harvard University - Kennedy School of Government
1987, J.D. Columbia University 1990. The opinions expressed in this Article are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §§ 1-101 to 14-110 (1989) (hereinafter Act).
2. Act at § 13-803 (as amended in House Bill 2643 (1991). The Illinois
telecommunications law constitutes Article 13 of the Act. The official name of the

Illinois' telecommunications law is the "Universal Telephone Service Protection Law
of 1985." Act at § 13-100.
3. Traditional rate-of-return regulation uses the classic ratemaking formula
"R.(revenue requirement) = C (operating costs) + Ir (invested capital or rate base
times rate of return on capital)." City of Charlottesville v. Federal Energy Regulatory

Comm'n, 774 F.2d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing T. Morgan, Economic
Regulation of Business 219 (1976)).

The revenue requirement reflects the amount that the Commission determines
the utility may recover from its customers by means of rates charged.
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While all states and the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") used to regulate telephone companies this way, many states
and the FCC have recently switched to alternative forms of regulation
that are easier and less costly to administer. Those in favor of
modifying the Illinois telecommunications law and adopting the
streamlined regulatory procedures developed by the FCC and other
states argue that such changes would lower costs, increase efficiency,
and promote network modernization without increasing telephone
rates. Those in favor of keeping the law the same argue that service
quality and rates have been very satisfactory under the current regulatory structure and that telephone companies want the law changed
merely in order to increase their profits; one should not "fix something
that ain't broke."
This Article will outline the current debate over Illinois' telecommunications regulatory structure. First, it will give some background
on the history and changes in national telecommunications regulatory
policy. Second, it will describe how telephone companies are regulated
under Illinois' current telecommunications law. Third, it will describe
the proposals for change, specifically incentive regulation for noncompetitive services and deregulation for truly competitive services. Fourth,
it will describe the critiques of these proposals. Finally, it will weigh
the competing arguments and conclude that modification of the
current telecommunications law is justified.
BACKGROUND

When first enacted five years ago (September 1985), the current
telecommunications law was considered very progressive. As one
newspaper reporter put it: "When it comes to loosening local communications regulations, no state has moved as quickly or as thoroughly as Illinois. . . . Illinois embraced competition in the
communications business before any other state." ' 4 The law's enactment marked the first wholesale change in Illinois telecommunications
regulation in 64 years.'
The catalyst for change was the breakup of AT&T's national
telephone monopoly. The saga began in November 1974, when the
Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against AT&T. After
seven-and-one-half years of litigation, AT&T settled with the Depart4. See Semilof, Deregulation: Illinois a Reformed State, NETWORK WORLD
May 19, 1986, at I [hereinafter NETWORK WORLD].
5. see Leon Hershey, AT&T, Competitors Face Uncertainty on Industry's
Future, LEGAi TIMES, December 22, 1986, at 19 n.36 [hereinafter LEGAL TIMES].
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ment of Justice out of court in January 1982 and agreed to the
divestiture of its local telephone companies. Judge Harold Greene

approved the settlement agreement seven months later in the nowfamous "Modified Final Judgment," ' 6 and the actual breakup of
AT&T occurred one-and-one-half years later in early 1984.1 The
breakup, necessitated by the emergence of interstate long-distance
competitors such as MCI and Sprint in the mid 1970s,8 marked the
end of an approximately 67-year national telecommunications policy

based upon the concept of regulated monopoly. 9 Starting around 1959

and culminating in the 1982 Modified Final Judgment, federal regu-

lators veered away from monopoly and towards competition as the
best way to promote diverse telecommunications services that were
reasonably priced and of high quality.

0

6. U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. California

v. U.S., 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). Judge Greene's decision was called the "Modified
Final Judgment" because it modified the final judgment reached in the Department
of Justice's previous antitrust action settled in 1956. See S. Rep. 41, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 n.10 (1991) [hereinafter "Senate Report"]; U.S. v. Western Electric Co., Civil
Action No. 17-49, Final Judgment, 1956 Trade Cas. 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
7. For the history of the AT&T breakup, see Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth
Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecom-

munications, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1983) [hereinafter MacAvoy & Robinson].
In 1982, Illinois was the only state publicly to support the breakup of AT&T. See
NETWORK WORLD, supra note 4, at 1.
8. For the history of MCI's emergence as a long-distance competitor, see
Jordan J. Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Reg-

ulated Monopolist, 79 NW. U.L. REV. 1183, 1187-98 (1984) [hereinafter Hillman].
9. Around 1915, state public service commissions began to realize that telephone service was most efficiently and fairly provided by a single company. The
experience of multiple telephone providers in the 1893-1915 period had been one of
poor service quality, wasteful duplication of facilities, high prices, and the neglect of

the rural population. See Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies That Changed the
Telephone Industry into Regulated Monopolies: Lessons from Around 1915, 39 FED.

COMM. L.J. 171, 176, 180-82 (1987) [hereinafter "Lessons From 1915"]; see
generally Mark S. Fowler, Albert Halprin & James B. Schlichting, "Back to the

Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38 Fed. Comm. L.J. 145, 150-53 (1986)
[hereinafter "Back to the Future"]. But see Harold Wilson, Is This Man Crazy?,

Telephony, December 31, 1990, at 16 ("By looking at explosive access/growth during
brief periods of competition such as 1895-1910, the report concludes that universal
service would have been achieved more quickly had local telephone service not
become a monopoly operation.").

10. See Lessons From 1915, supra note 9, at 191; see also Back to the Future,
supra note 9, at 153 ("The past thirty years have made it clear that the [monopoly]

paradigm does not apply, and perhaps should never have been applied, across-theboard to the entire telecommunications industry. The persistence of potential competitors, plus the development of new technologies, has effectively undermined the
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With the breakup of AT&T in 1984, AT&T relinquished control
over its local telephone companies in each state." In Illinois, for
example, Illinois Bell became an independent company. The Illinois
Commerce Commission was left with the responsibility of developing
a new intrastate long-distance interconnection relationship between
Illinois Bell's local telephone monopoly and AT&T, 12 one based on
arm's-length transactions between independent companies rather than
one based on internal, bureaucratic negotiations among departments
of a single company. 3
In addition, the AT&T breakup awoke the Illinois Commerce
Commission to the fact that competition was coming to the local
level. Just as advanced technology made long-distance competition
possible, so too could advanced technology threaten the monopoly of
local telephone companies. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission
described the changed regulatory landscape this way:
Historically, the commission has regulated all telephone utilities under a traditional rate-base, rate-of-return regulatory
approach. This approach was appropriate for "plain old telephone service," a single service system operated by a monopoly provider. As a consequence of evolving long distance
telecommunications technology, the traditional telephone industry became an increasingly attractive target for competitive
entry. In response, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the federal courts adopted policies encouraging
competition and customer choice. These federal actions could
not be ignored at the state level ....14
notion that outside companies can never become effective competitors of the telephone
companies."); Id. at 158 ("The effects of the recent injection of competition ...
and the promise of new technologies on the brink of realization all demonstrate the
necessity for changing our model for telecommunications.").
11. AT&T owned 22 local telephone companies (a.k.a. Bell Companies), which
collectively provided the only local telephone service to 80 percent of the nation's
population. See Senate Report, supra note 6, at 2. Independent local telephone
companies, such as GTE and Central Telephone, served the remaining 20 percent.
12. See Investigation Concerning the Appropriate Methodology For the Calculation of Intrastate Access Charges For all Illinois Telephone Utilities, Docket No.
83-0142, Order (Ill. Comm. Comm'n, released March 16, 1983). For example, an
intrastate long-distance call originating in Chicago travels through Illinois Bell's local
network until it reaches the boundaries of Illinois Bell's service area. At the boundary,
the call is transferred to AT&T's long-distance network where the call is transported
to the local telephone company in another part of Illinois. This transfer requires
interconnection between Illinois Bell and AT&T's networks.
13. See, e.g., LEGAL TIMES, supra note 5, at 19.
14. Investigation of the Level of Regulation of Intrastate InterLATA Toll

TELECOMMUNICATIONS
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Aware that local telephone companies had to be given the flexi-

bility to respond to potential competition, the Illinois Commerce
Commission immediately began to reconsider the way it regulated
local telephone companies. After "three years of research, study, and

numerous public hearings," the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law of 1985 was enacted in September 1985.11 According to the

current telecommunications law:

[RIecent federal regulatory and judicial rulings have caused a

restructuring of the telecommunications industry and have
opened some aspects of the industry to competitive entry,
thereby necessitating revision of State telecommunications regulatory policies and practices .... 16
How
I.

ILLINOIS TELEPHONE COMPANIES ARE CURRENTLY REGULATED

REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE SERVICES UNDER THE CURRENT
LAW

The major innovation of the current telecommunications law is

its recognition and treatment of "competitive" services. Just as the
AT&T breakup was based on the Department of Justice's recognition

that viable competition existed for interstate long-distance services,
the current Illinois telecommunications law was based on the General
Assembly's recognition that viable competition was developing for
local services. Advances in telecommunications technology made it
possible for small upstart companies to compete effectively with
Illinois Bell in certain service areas (e.g., wireless communications,
Telecommunications Service, 1988 Wisc. PUC LEXIS 61, 3-4 (July 28, 1988). See
also Petition of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company for Approval of a Proposal
for a Rate Stability Plan and Relaxed Earnings Surveillance for Certain Competitive
Services, Docket No. T087050398 at 3 (N.J. BPU released June 22, 1987) ("With
the advent of divestiture and the ever expanding evolution of federal pro-competitive
initiatives, telecommunications utilities now offer a mix of services, some of which
are clearly subject to the competitive forces of an open marketplace, while others
serve the more traditional utility role as monopoly services."); Charles Zielinski,
From TraditionalEconomic Regulation to New Policies and Roles in Telecommunications: A Challenge to State Governments at 16, in Council of State Policy &
Planning Agencies, The Challengeof Telecommunications: State Regulatory and Tax
Policiesfor a New Industry (August 1986) ("There is no dispute that the evolution
of technology and industry structure in telecommunications requires the states to
reassess their telecommunications regulatory policies.").
15. LEGAL Tnuds, supra note 5, at 19.
16. Act, at § 13-102(b).
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customer premises equipment, billing and collection, and inside wiring). The policies behind the current telecommunications law are the
promotion of competition and the abandonment of monopoly rateof-return regulation for those telephone services that have become or
are becoming competitive:
[T]he General Assembly declares that it is the policy of the
State of Illinois that: .... (b) when consistent with the protection of consumers of telecommunications services and the
furtherance of other public interest goals, competition should
be permitted to function as a substitute for certain aspects of
regulation in determining the variety, quality and price of
telecommunications services and that [sic] the economic burdens of regulation should be reduced to the extent possible
consistent with protection of the public interest ....,7
In a competitive as opposed to a monopoly environment, the
market and not the state public service commission dictates the price
of a service. If the state public service commission sets a price above
the market price, the regulated company will lose all of its business
because consumers will purchase from lower-priced alternative providers.'" Thus, given that competition was emerging for some telecommunications services, the current telecommunications law divided
telecommunications services into the groups "noncompetitive" and
"competitive." 19
A "competitive" service is defined as a "telecommunications
service, its functional equivalent or a substitute service, which .. .is
reasonably available from more than one provider .... ,,2oWhereas
17. Act, at § 13-103(b). See also Act at § 13-102(c): ("[T]he General Assembly

finds that: ... (c) the competitive offering of telecommunications services may create

the potential for increased innovation and efficiency in the provision of telecommun-

ications services and reduced prices for consumers . . ").
18. See generally Report of the Blue Ribbon Telecommunications Task Force
to the Illinois Commerce Commission (Monson, ed., January, 1991), [hereinafter

"Task Force Report"] ("Reductions in barriers to entry, whether generated by
changes in laws and regulations or generated by changes in technologies, reduce the
range of pricing discretion of regulators. If the barriers become small, the range of
pricing discretion may shrink to insignificance: Market pressures will dictate a price,
and regulators will be required to accept that price or see the utility lose some or all
of its share of the market.") Id. at 43.
19. Act, at § 13-502(a).
20. Act, at § 13-209. At present, the Commission has classified the following
services to be "competitive": Centrex, Ameritech Integrated Digital Network, Intra-
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noncompetitive services must be priced at a specific rate set by the
Commission, competitive services can be flexibly priced, with the
telephone company having pricing discretion within a Commissionapproved range. 2' Telephone companies can reduce prices below this

22
range upon filing the new price with the Commission. Prices can be
raised above this range only after23notice to all interested parties and
a hearing before the Commission.
While the current telecommunications law provides pricing flexi-

bility for a telephone company's competitive services, the costs and

revenues associated with these competitive services are still regulated.
A.

COMPETITIVE COSTS

Much of a telephone company's plant and equipment is used to

24
provide both competitive and noncompetitive services. For example,

state Billing and Collection, Packet Switched Network, Local Public Opinion Polling
Service, High Capacity Digital Service, Network Sales Expense, and Enhanced 911.
See Citizens Utility Board, Telecommunications Regulations: Overview and Recommendations 2 (February, 1991) [hereinafter "CUB Joint Committee Comments"];
Office of Public Counsel, Office of Public Counsel to the Report of the Blue Ribbon
Task Force to the Illinois Commerce Commission 8 (January 22, 1991) [hereinafter
"OPC Comments"].
Less than 4 percent of Illinois Bell's revenues come from its competitive services. See
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 105 (1989).
21. Act, at § 13-506(a). See generally Ringing Debate as Illinois Takes Up
Phone Deregulation, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1985 (Business Section) at 3.
22. Act, at § 13-505(a). Prices are not allowed to fall below the competitive
service's long-run marginal cost because of the policy against noncompetitive services
subsidizing competitive services. See Act at § 13-507.
23. See Act at §§ 13-505(b)(c), 13-504, 9-201(b).
24. When plant and equipment are used jointly for both types of services, the
costs of such plant and equipment are called "common costs." See AT&T Co. Long
Lines Department, Revisions of Tariff FCC No. 260 Private Line Services, Series
5000 (TELPAK), 38 Rad. Reg. 2d 1121, 1169 n.72 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1998 (1981) [hereinafter "Telpak"] ("Examples of these costs include executive
salaries, general advertising, some sales and marketing costs, printing, consultant
fees, as well as plant items used in common by two or more services (such as poles,
service equipment and vehicles), which are not attributable to any specific service.");
Back to the Future, supra note 9, at 169 ("By definition, these types of costs would
have to be incurred even if only one of the multiple services was being provided.").
The Independent Coin Payphone Association estimates that 20.3 percent (or $309
million) of Illinois Bell's annual costs are common costs. See Illinois GeneralAssembly
Joint Hearing on Illinois TelecommunicationsPolicy 11 (February, 1991) [hereinafter
"ICPA Comments"].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 11

a telephone company's telephone lines are used to transmit both
ordinary, noncompetitive voice telephone calls and competitive services such as Centrex. 25 Under Sections 13-103(d) and 13-507 of the
Act, the Commission is required to allocate a portion of the telephone
line's fixed common cost 2 6 to voice telephone calls and another portion
27

to Centrex.

Illinois courts have interpreted Section 13-507's prohibition against
the subsidization of competitive services by noncompetitive services
as requiring that a portion of common costs be allocated to competitive services. 28 It is considered unfair to make the captive ratepayers
of noncompetitive services-captive in that they cannot buy noncompetitive basic local service elsewhere-pay for all common costs and
let the customers of competitive services get off without paying their
fair share of such common costs.

29

25. Centrex is a switching service performed at the telephone company that
routes a business' internal calls from one office to another office in the same building.
See H. KmcHHOFF, New Telecom Lingo (5th ed. 1990). Illinois Bell has classified
Centrex as a "competitive" service. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89,
162 (1989).
26. Common costs are one type of "fixed" cost. Fixed costs are costs which
do not change with short-term changes in output (e.g., a warehouse).
27. Literally, Section 13-507 of the Act requires only that the Commission
ensure that prices for noncompetitive services "reflect only that portion of such
facilities or expenses which it finds to be proper and reasonable." In addition,

competitive service rates merely have to be "equal to or greater than ... long-run

marginal cost." Act, supra note I, at § 13-507.
However, an October 1990 Illinois Appellate Court ruling held that the allocation
of common costs to competitive services is implied by Section 13-507's prohibition
against the subsidy of competitive services by noncompetitive services. See The Office
of Public Counsel et al. v. I1l. Comm. Comm'n et al., 203 Ill. App. 3d 424, 441 (2d
Dist. 1990) [hereinafter "Appellate Court Case"].

Without an allocation of common costs to competitive services, competitive
services can be priced below their actual cost (i.e., subsidized) and noncompetitive
service rates will have to be raised to make up the difference.

28. See Appellate Court Case, supra note 27, at 441-42. Some scholars have

suggested that the allocation of common costs is "at the core of almost all the pricing
issues in telecommunications." See, e.g., A. Kahn and W. Shew, Current Issues in
Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 191, 194 (1987).

29. See Back to the Future, supra note 9, at 165 ("Cross-subsidization occurs
when costs-most prominently some joint costs and common costs-that are attributable to unregulated activities are improperly shifted into the revenue requirements
for regulated activities. Cost-shifting wrongly inflates the prices paid by ratepayers
for regulated services and artificially lowers the costs of the carrier's unregulated
services and products, which could result in predatory pricing by the carrier in the
competitive sphere.").
"Predatory pricing" is defined as the "deliberate sacrifice of present revenues
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COMPETITIVE REVENUES

In practice, the revenues earned from competitive services have

30
been been used to subsidize noncompetitive service rates. The public

policy rationale has been that basic telephone service is a public
necessity, not a luxury, and rates below actual cost are needed to
ensure that all people can afford to purchase telephone service. On
the other hand, competitive services are used mostly by businesses

and they can afford to pay more than actual cost to use these
services.31 Thus, the Commission has routinely maintained noncom-

petitive service rates below cost by taking revenues earned from
competitive services away from telephone companies to make up the

difference.
II.

REGULATION OF NONCOMPETITIVE SERVICES UNDER THE CURRENT
LAW

Noncompetitive services are regulated by means of a "cost-plus"
framework. The Commission is required to first determine the "reasonably and prudently incurred ' 3 2 costs associated with the provision
of noncompetitive services and then set prices equal to cost plus
"income . .. necessary to provide a reasonable return on the value
of the property of said public utility ....,3 A telephone company
has no pricing flexibility. Any proposed change in rates necessitates
34
45 days' notice to the public and a rate case hearing. The Commission

cannot limit the number of times a telephone company requests a rate
35
increase, even if the telephone company agrees to the limitation. If
for the purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses
through higher profits earned in the absence of competition." Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARv. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975).
30. See Task Force Report, supra note 18, at 34; Yale Article, supra note 7, at
4; Slutsker, Divestiture Revisited, Forbes Magazine at 118 (March 18, 1991) [hereinafter "Forbes Article"] ("Why do rate regulators tolerate this cross-subsidizing?
They want to play Robin Hood, overcharging heavy long-distance users so that basic
monthly service, perceived as a fundamental right, can be priced artificially low.");
Coy, Lewyn & Lopez, The Baby Bells Learn a Nasty New Word: Competition,
BUSINESS WEEK Magazine at 96 (March 25, 1991) [hereinafter "Business Week
Article"].
31. See Lessons From 1915, supra note 9, at 175-76, 189-90.
32. Act at § 13-507.
33. Act at § 9-202.
34. Act at § 9-201.
35. See Business and Professional People for the Public Interest et al. v. Illinois
Comm. Comm'n, 555 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Ill. 1989) (citing §§ 9-102, 9-201 of the Act)
[hereinafter "Business Case"] (electric company).
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a telephone company's costs fall because of increased efficiencies or
reduced investment, thereby creating a rate of return which is no
longer "reasonable," the Commission cannot instruct the telephone
company to refund retroactively a portion of excessive earnings to
consumers.3 6 Instead, the Commission can prospectively lower a telephone company's rate of return only by initiating a new rate case
hearing and ordering a reduction of future rates.17 Section 9-244 of
the Act authorizes the Commission to study alternative regulatory
plans that would permit retroactive refunds but limits Commission
action to legislative recommendations in favor of such plans.3"
THE CONTROVERSY OVER ADDITIONAL REFORM ILLINOIS BELL'S
REVENUE-SHARING PLAN

The controversy started in 1989 when the Commission modified
and approved Illinois Bell's revenue-sharing plan ("Plan").3 9 The
Plan was for two years and established a return on equity ("ROE")
range of between 12.76 and 15.0 percent. The target ROE was 12.76
percent (i.e., rates were set at a level estimated to yield a "reasonable"
ROE of 12.76 percent). Here comes the controversial part: if the rates
ended up yielding Illinois Bell a ROE above 12.76 percent but below
14.0 percent, Illinois Bell would refund 40 percent of the excess
earnings to customers and keep the rest. If the rates yielded a ROE
between 14.0 and 15.0 percent, Illinois Bell would refund 70 percent
of the excess earnings within this range and keep the rest. All excess
earnings above a 15.0 percent ROE would be refunded. Taking into
account the maximum possible revenue sharing (i.e., a ROE above
15.0 percent), the maximum earnings Illinois Bell could keep for itself
equals a ROE of 13.79 percent. 40
In addition, the Commission approved Illinois Bell's practice of
pricing competitive services at long-run marginal cost. 4 l Illinois Bell
36. The Illinois Supreme Court has held retroactive consumer refunds to be
illegal even where the public utility does not object. See Business Case, supra note
35, at 702, 710; see also Appellate Court Case, supra note 27, at 435-36.
37. Act at § 9-202.

38. See Appellate Court Case, supra note 27, at 437-38.
39. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89 (1989).

40. See id. at 115. In contrast, Illinois Bell's maximum permitted ROE under
traditional rate-of-return regulation was 15.85 percent. See "Illinois Needs New
Phone Regulation," Cm. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1990, Section 1, at 18 [hereinafter "Tribune
Article"].

41. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 170 (1989). Under a shortrun marginal cost analysis, "the capital costs of plant and equipment are treated as
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defines long-run marginal cost as the "total cost of new construction
unalterable or fixed ... and hence are excluded for the purpose of the estimate." J.
BONBRIGHT, A. DANIELSEN & D. KAMERSCHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES

at 418 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Principles]. In contrast, long-run marginal cost is
"measured under the assumption of a sustained increment in the rate of outputsustained for a period sufficiently long to require, or at least to justify, a change in
the capacity and design of the plant and equipment. This means that those capital
and operating costs which are treated as unalterable or fixed, and hence are excluded
in short-run cost analysis, are here treated as variable." Id. at 422.
Many courts have found that requiring companies to price their goods at or
above short-run marginal cost serves as an adequate safeguard against antitrust
violations, despite the fact that short-run marginal cost does not include any fixed
costs. See, e.g., 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d
76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
However, some courts have begun to question the sufficiency of a short-run
marginal cost standard. See MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 111920 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (citing William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 58 (1982); International Air Inds. Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.,
517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976)). See generally
C. Shimer, PredatoryPricing: The Retreat from the A VC Rule and the Search for a
PracticalAlternative, 22 B.C. L. REv. 467 (1981).
Both courts and state public utility commissions have argued that short-run
marginal cost pricing is an inadequate safeguard against anticompetitive crosssubsidization by regulated telephone companies. Regulated telephone companies have
a structural advantage over their competitors in that they alone provide both
monopoly and competitive services and they alone can shift all fixed costs to the
monopoly side in order to subsidize its competitive services. While the court in the
MCI Case did not have to decide the question, because the defendant AT&T did not
assert the right to price at short-run marginal cost, the court discussed the advantages
of a long-run marginal cost standard over a short-run marginal cost standard:
[Liong-run incremental cost differs from average variable cost in that it is
a long-run rather than a short-run cost measure. Because variable costs, by
definition, are associated with the limited time period in which a firm cannot
replace or increase its plant or equipment, the cost of plant and equipment
is regarded as fixed and is not included in the calculation of a product's
short-run marginal, or average variable, cost. Long-run incremental cost,
by contrast, measures all the costs of adding a new product or service"fixed"

as well as variable costs . .

.

. Hence, a number of the criticisms

that have been leveled against the choice of a short-run marginal cost
standard are not applicable to the use of long-run incremental cost.
See MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1115 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); see also Application of AT&T Communications of
Michigan, Inc. for Regulation Equivalent to That of Other Facilities-Based Interexchange Carriers in Michigan, Case No. U-9327 at 50 (Michigan PSC, released October
1, 1990) ("The problem with adopting short-run incremental costs to price competitive
services is that customers of those end up paying only for the variable cost of
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divided by the average units of demand. ' 42 Even though Illinois Bell's
pricing methodology appears, on its face, to include all costs associated with new construction, the methodology in fact does not include
an allocated portion of the common costs associated with new con43

struction.
In return for revenue sharing and long-run marginal-cost pricing
of competitive services, Illinois Bell agreed to institute an immediate

one-time $45.4 million rate reduction" and not request a rate increase
for two years. 45 The Commission approved the Plan based upon the
following findings:
providing the service and none of the fixed costs.
At the same time, however,
monopoly customers; e.g., local exchange customers, would ultimately have to absorb
the additional portion of fixed costs that other customers are not paying.").
42. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 162 (1989). Section 745.200(e)
of the Illinois Administrative Code defines "long-run marginal cost" as the "total
cost required to meet a sustained marginal increase in demand at any particular time
period in each year, presuming optimal adjustments in a telecommunications carrier's
plant and equipment." ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 83, § 745.200(e) (Supp. 1987). Compare
NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 704 § 704.7592(4) ('Long run incremental costs' includes
the operating expenses and capital costs of construction or investment over the long
run caused by adding a new service or group of services or avoided by eliminating a
service or group of services").
Minnesota is one of the few states that define "long-run marginal cost" by statute.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. 237.60(2)(i) (Supp. 1991) ("[Llong-run incremental cost means
the change in total cost associated with a change in volume of the service, expressed
on a per-unit basis"). Minnesota apparently intends for long-run marginal costs to
include both fixed costs (e.g., warehouses) and variable costs (e.g., electrical usage).
Minnesota distinguishes "long-run marginal cost" from "variable cost" by defining
"variable cost" as the "change in total cost, excluding fixed costs, associated with a
change in the volume of service, expressed on a per-unit basis. ..." Id. (emphasis

added).
While Wisconsin's statute does not define long-run marginal cost, it apparently does
not include common costs within the definition because it requires that competitive
service prices recover "long-run incremental cost plus any contribution to overhead
costs...." 24 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.195(9) (emphasis added).
43. The Commission conceded that it had never required Illinois Bell to allocate
common costs to the pricing of its competitive services since the law began distinguishing between noncompetitive and competitive services in 1985. See Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 162, 170 (1989). Just because a telephone company
labels its cost study "long-run" does not mean it actually is. The FCC determined
that AT&T's so-called long-run marginal cost study for its competitive services was
actually a "short-run" marginal cost study, because it treated some costs as fixed
and excluded them from the cost calculation. See Telpak, supra note 24, para. 121,
at 1165-66, para. 126, at 1168.
44. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 200 (1989).
45. See id.at 115-16.
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1. It will allow the Company greater flexibility in responding
to rapidly changing and increasingly competitive telecommunications markets, while insuring that the Company's
earnings do not exceed a range which the Commission has
found to be just and reasonable.
2. It will allow ratepayers an opportunity to share in earnings
as they exceed the benchmark level to fluctuate within a
range that the Commission has determined to be just and
reasonable, an opportunity that does not exist under traditional rate of return regulation.
3. It provides total protection to ratepayers in the event the
Company's earnings exceed the range the Commission has
found to be just and reasonable; a protection that does
not exist under traditional rate of return regulation.
4. It provides for retroactive relief for ratepayers which does
not exist under traditional rate of return regulation.
5. It will provide the Commission with valuable experience
for use in making recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to regulatory systems in connection with
the sunset provisions of Article XIII of the Public Utilities
Act.
6. It has the potential for improving the Company's operational efficiencies, and experience with the modified structure may allow the Company and the Commission to
better identify these efficiencies.4
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION FOR NONCOMPETITIVE SERVICES

In brief, the alleged benefits of alternative regulation for noncompetitive services fall into three categories: (1) telephone companies will
have a greater incentive to operate efficiently, thus resulting in lower
operating costs and lower consumer prices; (2) administrative costsand the need for taxpayer money-will go down because the Commission will spend less time presiding over hotly contested rate case
proceedings; and (3) ratepayers will be able to get retroactive refunds
for unreasonably high rates rather than simply have future rates
reduced after a rate case proceeding.

I.

INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND LOWER RATES

There is widespread recognition that traditional rate-of-return
("ROR") regulation does not provide telephone companies with the
46. Id. at 116.
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strongest incentives for operating efficiently. As discussed briefly
above, under ROR regulation, the Commission permits a telephone
company to earn a specific "reasonable" ROE. If the telephone
company operates more efficiently and cuts costs, its ROE will go up
and become, by definition, "unreasonable." The Commission will,
therefore, initiate a new rate case proceeding and lower the telephone
company's rates. Thus, the telephone company's increased efficiency
is not rewarded but merely results in a rate reduction.
It is true that because retroactive refunds are prohibited and
contested rate case proceedings needed to reduce rates often take a
year or more to complete, telephone companies do have some incentive
to increase efficiency because they are able to keep all excess earnings
up to the time the rate reduction is put into effect. 47 Many people,
including those at the FCC, think "regulatory lag" does not create
enough incentive; the ability to retain a portion of excess earnings is
needed to promote operating efficiency.4 8 In advocating that the new
telecommunications law permit alternative regulation, a Chicago Tribune editorial stated: "Besides being unnecessarily cumbersome and
litigious, the old system of restricting a company's rate of return
produces no incentives to operate more efficiently or to invent new
products because profits from such gains can't be retained. ' 49 Dr.
Alfred E. Kahn, distinguished professor emeritus of political economy
at Cornell University and special consultant to National Economic
Research Associates, Inc., recently testified before the Florida Public
Service Commission and argued that:
47. The time between the advent of excess earnings and the rate reduction is
called "regulatory lag." See Alternatives to Rate Base Regulation of Telephone
Communications Systems at the Local Exchange Company Level, 113 PUR 4th 481,
487 (Nevada PSC 1990) ("There is an inherent lag in traditional ratemaking. A
telephone company with low earnings experiences those low earnings until the end of
a rate case when rates are increased. The ratepayer benefits from this lag. However,

a company which is overearning keeps any excess earnirigs and continues to overearn
until the end of an overearnings investigation when rates are decreased").
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 200 (1989), a representative of
the Citizens Utility Board argued that alternative regulation is not needed because
"it is not clear the incentives will necessarily be different or greater than those already

existing under rate of return regulation [because] the existence of regulatory lag

creates some incentive to cut costs." Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89,
105 (1989).
48. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195, 3254 para. 105 (1988) ("[A]lthough
itis true that 'regulatory lag' helps establish incentives for efficiency, such incentives
are likely to be quite weak.").
49. Tribune Article, supra note 40.
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[Riate-of-return regulation, by its very nature, cannot provide
a company with adequate incentives to operate in the most
efficient possible way ....
Manifestly, the kind of regulatory
oversight that accompanies cost-plus regulation is inevitably a
highly imperfect substitute for a regime in which the company
itself has a powerful incentive continuously to search out ways
for providing service with maximum efficiency.50
Many states agree. Over two-thirds of the states have adopted or
authorized alternative regulation for noncompetitive and/or competitive services. 5 At least 27 states presently regulate noncompetitive
services by means of alternative regulation. At least 16 states have
statutes expressly authorizing their public service commissions to
adopt alternative forms of regulation for noncompetitive services:
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.5 2 For example, the
Washington statute states:
The legislature declares that: (a) Changes in technology and
the structure of the telecommunications industry may produce
conditions under which traditional rate of return, rate base
regulation of telecommunications companies may not in all
cases provide the most efficient and effective means of achieving the public policy goals of this state .... The commission
should be authorized to employ an alternative form of regulation if that alternative is better suited to achieving those
policy goals.53
Similarly, the South Carolina statute states:
50. Direct Testimony of Alfred E. Kahn, Central Telephone-Florida, No.
891246-TL, at 6-7 (Fla. PSC, filed June 12, 1990).
51. See Tribune Article, supra note 40.

52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.036 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-225.1(f) (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-16.9 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 61622A (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.625 (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 77-3-2(1)(h) (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-802(2) (1991) (cited in
1991 Montana Laws ch. 210); NEB. REv. STAT. § 86-807(1) (1987) and Rule and
Regulation No. 89, 92 PUR 4th 215 (Neb. PSC 1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §

704.040(4) (Michie Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.3 (1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE § § 49-21-01.2 - 01.3 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-330 (Supp. 1990);

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 49-31-4.1 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-4.1
(Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, 226a(b)(6)-(7) (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE

§ 80.36.135(1) (1991).

53. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.135(1) (1991).
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For the purpose of encouraging economy, efficiency and improvements in methods of service any telephone utility may
participate, subject to the approval of the Commission, to
such extent as may be permitted by the Commission, in the
additional profits arising from any economy, efficiency or
improvement in methods or service instituted by such tele4

phone utility.1

The public utility commissions from at least 16 other states have
adopted alternative regulation plans for noncompetitive services based
upon their existing general administrative authority conferred by
statute: Alabama, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin." In addition, the Federal Communications Commission has adopted price
regulation for both AT&T 6 and the interstate services of local telephone companies5 7 with the hope of spurring efficiency improvements.
The Citizens Utility Board, the Office of Public Counsel, and
the Governor's Office of Consumer Services have argued that there
is no evidence that alternative regulation actually increases efficiency
or actually lowers prices. Citing states which have implemented alternative regulation is interesting but does not prove that alternative
regulation works. Illinois ratepayers already enjoy some of the lowest
§ 58-9-330 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers,
107 PUR 4th 1, 105 (California PUC 1989); RE Experimental Plan for the Optional
Regulation of Telephone Companies, 99 PUR 4th 270, 272 (Virginia PUC 1988);
Investigation of the Kentucky Intrastate Rates of South Central Bell Telephone
Company, Case No. 10105 at 9 (KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1988); Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.'s Proposal for Network Modernization, Rate Stability and Pricing
Regulation, a/k/a "Telekansas", Docket No. 166,856-U at 36 (Ks. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n. 1990); Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its
Proposed Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-104 at 91-92 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
1990); Investigation of the Revenue Requirements, Rate Structures, Charges, Services,
Rate of Return and Construction Program of South Central Bell, Docket No. U17949-A, Order No. U-17949-G at 73-76 (LA Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 1991).
56. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC Rcd.
2873 (1989).
57. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd.
6786, 6789 (1990) ("By establishing limits on prices carriers can charge for their
services, and placing downward pressure on these limits or 'caps,' we create a
regulatory environment that requires carriers to become more productive. Carriers
that can substantially increase their productivity can earn and retain profits at
54. S.C. CODE ANN.

reasonable levels above those we allow for rate of return carriers ....

Rate of return

regulation lacks incentives for carriers to become more productive.").
58. See Citizens Utility Board, Response to the Report of the Blue Ribbon
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rates in the country. In addition, Illinois Bell has instituted an

"aggressive" network modernization program . 9 According to the
consumer groups, there is no reason to risk these advantages on some
unproven theory. 60
This criticism is not very fair given that alternative regulation is
relatively new and has not been given enough time to produce
conclusive results. Even so, some proof exists.
II. EVALUATION OF TELEPHONE COMPANY PERFORMANCE UNDER
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION PLANS FOR NONCOMPETITIVE SERVICES IN
VARIOUS STATES

In October 1990, the FCC completed an evaluation of AT&T's
performance after one year of price regulation. The evaluation was
very positive, finding that customer rates had decreased, new services
were introduced, and service quality remained high. The FCC found
that "AT&T customers have benefitted by some $727 million in
reduced rates under price cap regulation" and concluded its findings
by stating:
In summary, AT&T price cap regulation is producing verifiable
achievements. Preliminary assessment of some of the major
dimensions-customer prices, earnings, new services, compet6
itive markets, and service quality-reveal encouraging results. '
The consulting firm of Theodore Barry & Associates ("TB&A")
recently completed an audit of South Central Bell Telephone's
("SCBT") operations two years after Kentucky's alternative regulation plan became effective. TB&A concluded that SCBT's operating
efficiency, construction planning, and service quality had all improved
during the two years of alternative regulation. 62 Of particular note
Telecommunications Task Force to the Illinois Commerce Commission at 6 (filed
January 22, 1991) [hereinafter "CUB Comments"]; OPC Comments, supra note 20,

at 9-10; Governor's Office of Consumer Services, Response to the Report of the Blue

Ribbon Telecommunications Task Force to the Illinois Commerce Commission at 3
(filed January 23, 1991) [hereinafter "GOCS Comments"].
59. See Illinois Bell Co., 108 PUR 4th 89 at 105, 156-60 (1989).

60. CUB Comments, supra note 58, at 7; OPC Comments, supra note 20, at
10-11; GOCS Comments, supra note 58, at 2.

61. House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., AT&T's Performance under
Price Cap Regulation at "Executive Summary," pp. 1-3 (FCC Common Carrier
Bureau, October 1990).
62. Theodore Barry & Associates, A Review of the Incentive Regulation Plan

of South Central Bell Telephone Company of Kentucky-September 1990, at 111-3,

IV-8 to IV-10 [hereinafter "TB&A Kentucky Report"].(Prepared for the Kentucky

Public Service Commission.)
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was TB&A's finding that customer rates had decreased during the
alternative regulation plan: "Consumers have benefited from rate
reductions in absolute terms, because several rate reductions have
been realized since the implementation of the incentive plan." 63 While
the short period of time made it impossible to conclude that alternative
regulation was the primary cause of these improvements, TB&A saw
enough promise to recommend that the alternative regulation plan be
extended an additional three to five years.64
TB&A did a similar audit of SCBT under alternative regulation
in Alabama. TB&A recommended that Alabama's alternative regulation plan (in effect since November 1986) be extended after finding
that alternative regulation was less costly to administer and "poses
no threat to the Alabama customer. ' 65 One of its criticisms was that
the alternative regulation plan did not go far enough in providing
stronger incentives to the telephone company." The Alabama Public
Service Commission ("APSC") has extended the alternative regulation
plan twice, first in 1988 and again in 1990, the plan now running
through 1993. In extending the plan the second time, the APSC noted
that "the Commission feels that [the alternative regulation plan] has
served the public interest extremely well as the ratepayers of the State
of Alabama have enjoyed the benefits of over $87 million in rate
reductions since the inception of [the alternative regulation plan].1"67
The Idaho Public Service Commission ("IPSC") renewed Mountain States Telephone's revenue-sharing plan after an IPSC staff
member reported that the plan had increased the telephone company's
"incentive to operate efficiently." The IPSC also renewed the plan
6
because it "provides for stability and predictability." a

63. Id. at IV-7.
64. See id. at 111-4. Based on TB&A's recommendation, the Kentucky Public
Service Commission fecently extended alternative regulation for SCBT for an additional three years, finding that alternative regulation "is in the public interest." See
A Review of the Rates and Charges and Incentive Regulation Plan of South Central
Bell Telephone Company, No. 90-256, Phase I at 4 (Ky. P.S.C. released Arpil 3,
1991).
65. South Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 3 (Alab. PSC, released
December 8, 1988).
66. Id.

67. South Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 14 (Alab. PSC, November
5, 1990).
68. In re Commission Staff Evaluation of U S West Communications' Idaho
Revenue Sharing Plan, Case No. MTB-T-90-3, Order No. 23531, at 8, 10 (Idaho
PSC, January 22, 1991).
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III.

REDUCED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

As discussed above, under traditional regulation, a telephone
company's rates are set by the Commission after all interested parties
have an opportunity to be heard. Such hearings are very costly in
both time and money. In the recent Illinois Bell Case where the
Commission approved Illinois Bell's alternative regulation plan, 24
parties intervened, 4,500 data requests were issued and answered, 53
hearings were conducted and more than 8,000 pages of transcript were
produced. The Commission's decision was subsequently appealed to
the Illinois appellate court in the Appellate Court Case. Many people
testified during weeks of oral testimony, and numerous briefs were
filed. The appellate court reversed the Commission's decision and
remanded the case to the Commission, thus ensuring additional
Commission proceedings and possible additional appeals.
Much of this adversarial activity dealt with challenges to expenditures, cost allocations, and the target return on equity. In contrast,
under alternative regulation such as revenue sharing, rates need not
be adjusted via a long and costly rate case but can instead be adjusted
via automatic customer refunds. Consumer groups could argue that
under traditional regulation the Commission can reduce administrative
costs by simply not initiating a new rate case immediately upon
discovering an "unreasonable" return on equity. The problem with
this is that not bringing a new rate case locks in the unreasonable
return and ratepayers get no relief.
A.

REVENUE SHARING

The Citizens Utility Board and the Office of Public Counsel have
argued that revenue sharing has its own administrative difficulties and
costs, equal if not larger than those of traditional rate cases. 69 Disputes
have arisen over the calculation and distribution of refunds under
revenue-sharing plans in Idaho and Wisconsin. 70 However, neither
69. See OPC Comments, supra note 20, at 9-10; Illinois Telecommunications

Regulation, Part 2: Reply to Comments from the Citizens Utility Board to the Joint
Committee of the General Assembly on Telecommunications Rewrite at 4 (February,
1991) ("Looking just across the Illinois border to Wisconsin, a two year experiment
in alternative regulation resulted in considerably higher regulatory and litigation
costs").

70. See "Direct Testimony and Exhibit of James E. Wozniak," In re Commission Staff Evaluation of U S West Communications' Idaho Revenue Sharing Plan,
Case No. MTB-T-90-3, at 8-10 (August 31, 1990) (controversy between U S West
and the Commission over whether refund money should be distributed to both
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Idaho nor Wisconsin has gone back to traditional regulation. Idaho
recently renewed its revenue-sharing plan, finding it "easier and less
costly to administer . . . .'"
While disputes arose over the calculation and distribution of
refunds under Wisconsin Bell's revenue-sharing plan, the Wisconsin
Public Service Commission ("WPSC") concluded that revenue sharing
had been a success:
As a result of this experiment, several benefits accrued to the
company, the Commission and the ratepayers. First, rates
were stable for two years. Second, customers will receive a
refund of $26,422,000. This reflects a sharing between ratepayers and stockholders of the productivity gains realized
during the two-year period. Third, productivity was relatively
high and costs relatively low compared to other Bell companies
72
and other telephone companies.
Upon expiration of the revenue-sharing plan, the WPSC did not go
back to traditional rate-of-return regulation. To the contrary, the
WPSC decided to approve price regulation, a more radical departure
73
from traditional rate-of-return regulation than revenue sharing.
In February 1990, the New York Public Service Commission
("NYPSC") evaluated Rochester Telephone Corporation's ("RTC")
performance under a 1987 rate moratorium alternative regulation
plan 74 and decided not only to extend alternative regulation, but also
to transform it into price regulation with revenue sharing. 75 The
NYPSC decided to extend alternative regulation because:
business and residential customers or to just residential customers); Application of
Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its Proposed Rates and Tariffs, Docket
6720-TR-104, 92 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990) ("The recent experience in determining the amount and method of refund under the shared earnings mechanism...
led the Commission to consider other alternatives").
71. In re Commission Staff Evaluation of U S West Communications' Idaho
Revenue Sharing Plan, Case No. MTB-T-90-3, Order No. 23531, at 8, (Idaho PSC,
January 22, 1991).
72. Review of Financial Data as Filed by Wisconsin Bell, Inc., Docket No.
6720-TI-102, at 33-34 (Wisc. PSC, June 15, 1990).
73. See Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its Proposed
Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-104, 89-96 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990).
74. Rochester Telephone Corporation-Opinion and Order Approving Rate
Decrease and Rate Moratorium, No. 29551, Opinion No. 87-12 (N.Y. PSC, June 17,
1987).
75. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges,
Rules and Regulations of Rochester Telephone Corporation, No. 89-C-022, Opinion
No. 90-8 at Appendix C pp. 3-4 (N.Y. PSC, released February 14, 1990).
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in comparison to previous moratoria approved by the Commission, the rate plan under consideration provides more in
the way of incentives to the company to maximize its efforts
to control costs and increases its productivity, and more
realizable benefits to the ratepayers. The benefits to the ratepayers are more probable because of the strength of the
incentives to RTC to control costs and because of the structure
of the sharing mechanism. Moreover, these benefits will accrue
76
with little risk to the ratepayers.
Many state public service commissions (e.g., Alabama, California, Idaho, Kentucky, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin)"
have adopted alternative regulation because of expected reduced administrative costs. For example, Kentucky's Public Service Commission remarked in adopting an alternative regulation plan: "The
Incentive Plan approach to rate-making eliminates the traditional rate
case and sets up a system of automatic test points to increase or
decrease rates. This reduces [South Central Bell's] and parties' costs
associated with rate cases." 7 8 Washington's alternative regulation
statute expressly states that alternative regulation could "reduce regulatory delay and costs." ' 79 In TB&A's evaluation of Alabama's twoyear-old alternative regulation plan, TB&A concluded that alternative
regulation "costs less to administer than previous regulatory review
programs."80

76. Id. at 21.

77. South Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 3 (Alab. PSC, released
December 8, 1988); Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers,
107 PUR 4th 1, 105 at 106-7 (California PUC 1989); In re Application of U S West
Communications for a Rate Reduction and Approval of a Revenue Sharing Plan for
Compliance with the Cost Allocation Provisions of Idaho Code 61-622A, Case No.
MTB-T-88-13, Order No. 22738, at 8, 12 (Idaho PUC, September 21, 1989); Investigation of the Kentucky Intrastate Rates of South Central Bell Telephone Company,
Case No. 10105 at 9 (KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1988); Generic Proceeding to Consider
Intrastate Incentive Regulation, Case No. 90-266-C, Order No. 90-849, at 6 (S.C.
PSC, September 5, 1990); Washington Utilities & Transportation Comm'n v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., Docket No. U-89-3245-P, Fourth Supplemental Order,
at 34 (Wash. UTC, released January 16, 1990); Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc.
for an Investigation of Its Proposed Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-104, at 92
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990).
78. Investigation of the Kentucky Intrastate Rates of South Central Bell Telephone Company, Case No. 10105 at 9 (KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1988).
79. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 80.36.135(2)(a) (1991).
80. South Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 3 (Alab. PSC, released
December 8, 1988) (citing to a report at 11-5).
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Costs are measured not just in dollars but also in time. In TB&A's
evaluation of Kentucky's alternative regulation plan, TB&A concluded
that "the elimination of [South Central Bell Telephone Company's]
general rate cases has freed [Commission] staff time. In certain cases,
additional staff time was used to continue the [Commission's] investigation of several important telecommunications regulatory issues. ... "I'
B. PRICE REGULATION
Pure price regulation (i.e., no revenue-sharing component) is even
less costly to administer than revenue-sharing regulation. 2 Kansas,
Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wisconsin either have adopted or are expressly authorized by statute
to adopt pure price regulation."3 Price regulation limits rates charged
81. See TB&A Kentucky Report, supra note 62, at IV-20. See also South
Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 3 (Alab. PSC, released December 8,
1988) ("The Commission established a ...monitoring team to review the Company's
operations and to monitor the implementation of the [alternative regulation plan].
Through the monitoring team, the Commission has sought and received detailed
information concerning the Company's operations and financial performance. The
availability of this information has enabled this Commission to gain a more thorough
knowledge and to more effectively regulate the Company's operations than it did
under previous regulation, confined primarily to the reactive rate case format.")
82. While consumer groups argue that the potential administrative costs associated with auditing revenue-sharing calculations militate in favor of retaining traditional rate-of-return regulation, others have argued that such administrative costs
militate in favor of more radical forms of alternative regulation, such as pure price
regulation. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges,
Rules and Regulations of Rochester Telephone Corporation, No. 89-C-022, Opinion
No. 90-8 at Appendix C pp. 4-6 (N.Y. PSC, released February 14, 1990) (Eli M.
Noam, Commissioner, dissenting) ("The Sharing mechanism, as presently written, is
too complicated with its back-and-forth flop. Why not drop it altogether? . . . [T]he

mere existence of the sharing [mechanism] requires constant and complex allocations
of costs, revenues, and activities, because it makes a difference where a dollar of
profit is being made when some of it may have to be shared . . .If one wants to

protect consumers, lower their prices directly, rather than indirectly through restraints
on company profits." If we drop sharing, we can simplify regulation. For example,
there is no need to regulate or deal with depreciation. There is no need to approve
investment plans. There is no need to control intra-corporate transactions ....
(emphasis in original).
83. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.'s Proposal for Network Modernization,
Rate Stability and Pricing Regulation, a/k/a "Telekansas", Docket No. 166,856-U
at 22, 36 (Ks. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1990; NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-807(1); Investigation
of the Revenue Requirements, Rate Structures, Charges, Services, Rate of Return
and Construction Program of South Central Bell, Docket No. U-17949-A, Order No.
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to consumers, not a telephone company's return on equity. Typically,
rates are permitted to change via a formula based on inflation and
expected productivity.14 For example, if inflation goes up 5 percent
and the telephone company is expected to increase productivity/
U-17949-G at 73-76 (LA Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1991); Rule and Regulation No. 89,
92 PUR 4th 215 (Neb. PSC 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 49-21-01.2 to 01.3; S.D.
CODMFED LAWS ANN. 49-31-4.1; Investigation of the Proposed Modified "Vermont
Telecommunications Agreement", Docket No. 5293 at 10 (Vt. PSC released December
30, 1988); Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its Proposed
Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-104, at 92-94 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 1990).
The FCC, California, and New York each have adopted "hybrid" price regulation plans, which combine price regulation with revenue sharing. For example, the
FCC plan for AT&T has sharing above the authorized rate of return and an upper
earnings boundary above which all earnings are returned to ratepayers. While the
FCC chose to include an upper earnings boundary ("automatic stabilizer"), it
admitted that such a boundary would reduce efficiency incentives for AT&T:
We believe that our proposed automatic stabilizer does not eliminate the
incentives created by the price cap regime to operate increasingly efficiently.
It must be recognized, however, that the mechanism would dampen at a
certain level of achieved productivity the incentives on which the success of

price cap regulation is premised.

Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873, 3216
para. 710 (1989).
In a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning price regulation
for local telephone companies, the FCC reported that
[a]lmost all [local telephone companies] argue that the automatic stabilizer
ultimately frustrates the purposes of incentive regulation by perpetuating

the flawed incentives of rate of return regulation which the [local telephone
company] pricecap proposal was designed to eliminate ....

They conclude

that it should be abandoned in favor of a pure price caps plan or that it
should be modified in various ways.
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Supplemental Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 2176, 2231-32 paragraphs 114-15 (1990). Despite

the protestations of the local telephone companies, the FCC tentatively decided to
include revenue sharing in its price regulation plan at least partly because some
economic studies had concluded that "regulatory regimes which include some sharing
of overearnings provide greater welfare than those which do not." Id. at 2248
paragraph 151. However, it appears that neither the FCC nor the authors of these
economic studies, in concluding that price regulation with revenue sharing is better
than pure price regulation, considered the administrative costs associated with frequent auditing or the litigation costs associated with revenue-sharing disputes.
84. Rates must decrease by an expected productivity gain, regardless of whether
the telephone company actually achieves this productivity gain. See, e.g., Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6799 (1990) (3.3
percent expected productivity gain); Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to
the Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Rochester Telephone Corporation, No.
89-C-022, Opinion No. 90-8 at Appendix C pp. 1-2 (N.Y. PSC, released February

14, 1990) (3.25 percent expected productivity gain).
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efficiency by 3 percent, the telephone company's rates are permitted
to go up 2 percent (5 percent minus 3 percent).
Thus, price regulation is a gamble for telephone companies. If
they can improve productivity by more than the expected productivity
offset, they can earn more than they otherwise would make under
traditional ROR regulation.85 On the other hand, if they fail to
improve productivity by the expected amount, they make less money
than they otherwise would make.16 Given the risk, price regulation
should be optional and telephone companies should be able to choose
between price regulation and traditional ROR regulation.
If telephone companies choose price regulation, they should not
be permitted to lower their downside risk by reducing costs and service
quality. By lowering costs and service quality, telephone companies
would be able to keep their rate of return high despite not accomplishing the expected productivity target. 87 An example of this bad behavior
occurred in New York with New York Telephone ("NYT"). The New
York Public Service Commission adopted price regulation for NYT
without requiring NYT to maintain service quality. An evaluation of
NYT's performance under price regulation showed a marked deterioration in service quality and an increase in customer complaints. 8
85. As the Michigan Public Service Commission has explained it:
Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, a carrier may not have significant
incentive to be efficient because earnings in excess of an authorized rate of
return may lead to further rate reductions. On the other hand, price cap
regulation focuses on prices and price levels rather than on costs by setting
maximum limits on the prices that may be charged for services. As a
substitute for rate-of-return regulation, a carrier's prices rather than its
earnings are subject to regulation. As a result, a carrier has more incentive
to be efficient because its earnings are directly related to its productivity.
Application of AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. for Regulation
Equivalent to That of Other Facilities-Based Interexchange Carriers in
Michigan, Case No. U-9327 at 76-77 (Michigan PSC, released October 1,
1990).

86. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd.

6786, 6789 (1990) ("If carriers fail to become more productive, they risk seeing their
earnings erode.").
87. See id. at 6827 ("LECs under price cap regulation might seek to increase
their profits not by becoming more productive, but by lowering the quality of the
service they provide.").
The danger also exists with revenue-sharing plans. See TB&A Kentucky Report,
supra note 62, at V-5 ("In addition to its benefits, the [Kentucky Public Service
Commission] recognized that the incentive plan's sharing mechanism also presented
an element of risk to ratepayers; that is, providing an incentive for [South Central
Bell] to maximize its short-term return on capital could also tempt it to forgo essential
expenditures needed to maintain reliable service.")
88. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges,
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Given NYT's bad performance under price regulation, the New York
Public Service Commission failed to renew NYT's price regulation
plan. 89 The Communications Division of the New York Public Service
Commission recommended that the New York Commission not adopt
a new alternative regulation plan until it formulated specific service
quality goals for NYT to accomplish and developed an adequate

monitoring mechanism. 9° The new telecommunications law should
require that the Commission only implement alternative regulation if

it first determines that the particular alternative regulation plan does
not jeopardize service quality. 9'

Rules and Regulations of New York Telephone Company, No. 90-C-0191, Opinion
No. 91-4 at 171-79 (NY PSC, March 7, 1991).
89. Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules
and Regulations of New York Telephone Company for Telephone Service-Rate
Moratorium Extension-Fifth-Stage Filing-Request for Approval of Settlement
Agreement, 1990 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 17, (NY PSC, released April 26, 1990).
90. In the words of the Communications Division:
One criticism of incentive regulation is that it may encourage carriers
to diminish service quality by reducing maintenance costs and plant additions
in an effort to bolster earnings. Incentive regulation must insure that where
competition is minimal or does not exist, customers are assured of high
quality service. Our recent experience suggests that any form of incentive
regulation must guarantee that New York Telephone will maintain adequate
levels of service quality. As noted earlier in this memorandum, service
quality has been less than satisfactory recently ....

Consumer complaints

to the Commission have been at high levels, customer information needs
have not been adequately addressed, and the general level of repair service
has been inadequate ....

[Sipecific service quality targets first must be established over the term of
the incentive plan. Those objectives should be able to be measured, monitored and, above all, achieved. ...
If incentive regulation will work at all, and we believe it can, the establishment of specific, achievable, measurable goals and a regulatory framework
aimed at their achievement appears to be crucial to progressing toward more
efficient company operations, the timely deployment of advanced technology
and services, a permanent improvement in service quality and the availability
of a network which is more open to competition.
CASE 28961-New York Telephone Moratorium, Phase II, Fifth Stage: Proposed
Incentive Regulation Plan-Discussion of Major Issues in Need of Resolution and
Recommended Review Procedure, memorandum from Communications Division to
the New York Public Service Commission, at 16, 18, 23-24 (written June 19, 1990
and filed June 27, 1990).
91. The statutes in at least three states (Florida, Vermont, and Washington)
require their public utility commissions to make such a finding before approving an
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Pure price regulation is easy to administer because adjustments
are based on objective measurements-measurements outside of the
alternative regulation plan. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.036(2)(g) (West 1968 & Supp.
1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 226a(b)(2)-(3) (1968 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 80.36.135(3)(e) (1991).
In addition, the FCC and many state public utility commissions have made
equipment modernization and the maintenance of service quality integral parts of
sanctioned alternative regulation plans. See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6827 (1990) ("[W]hile we believe that our
price cap plan creates strong incentives to maintain high quality and to develop the
network, we will also expand significantly our monitoring of service quality and
infrastructure development."); Application of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its Proposed Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-104, at 98 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 1990). ("The Commission also determined that a measure of success for
this plan should be based on the filing of a five-year construction plan by the
Company."); In re Northwestern Bell Telephone Company's Proposed Incentive
Regulation Plan, No. P-421/Ei-89-860, at 33 (Minn. PUC, June 7, 1990) ("The
Commission believes the switch modernization program proposed by the Company
is prudent and should proceed. It is clearly appropriate for all areas of the state to
have access to the services digital technology makes available."); Tennessee Regulatory Reform Plan, at 3 (Tenn. PSC, July 31, 1990) ("The Plan incorporates a
technology deployment commitment to enhance the telecommunications network
throughout the state."), cited in In re Tennessee Regulatory Reform Plan, No. 9006170 (Tenn. PSC, August 17, 1990); In re Generic Proceeding to Consider Intrastate
Incentive Regulation, No. 90-266-C, Order No. 90-1009, at 6, Appendix A (S.C.
PSC, October 19, 1990) ("To enjoy the benefit of retaining additional earnings and
sharing earnings with its ratepayers, the participating LEC has the burden of
demonstrating increased efficiencies and productivity and must be accountable for
making appropriate investments in its regulated activities."); In re Application of
Michigan Bell Telephone Company for Authority to Implement a Trial Plan for
Modified Regulation, No. U-8987, at 45 (Mich. PSC, March 13, 1990) (If Michigan
Bell "has not made a good faith effort to complete the budgeted and enhanced
construction," its sharing percentage drops from 50 percent to 10 percent); South
Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 4 (Alab. PSC, released December 8,
1988); South Central Bell Telephone, Case No. 19983, at 1-2 (Alab. PSC, November
5, 1990):
With the addition of the incentive portion of the ... [alternative regulation
plan], the Commission sought to encourage the Company to achieve appropriate standards for service quality and to contain costs through efficiency.
The Company has experienced two rate reductions subsequent to implementation of the incentive plan and achieved a forty percent sharing incentive
at both reductions. Additionally, under the Sustained Performance Clause
the Company has maintained the incentives through vigilant efforts to
maintain service quality standards and cost containment.
See also Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.'s Proposal for Network Modernization, Rate Stability and Pricing Regulation, a/k/a "Telekansas", Docket
No. 166,856-U at 20 (Ks. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1990) ("[Tlhe stipulation
requires SWBT to invest $160 million in network upgrades which will provide
higher quality service to basic local ratepayers with no increase in basic local
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telephone company's power to manipulate. In contrast, earnings
calculations are easy for telephone companies to manipulate because
they are the source of earnings information. The California Public
Service Commission emphasized this point when adopting price regulation:
Another significant advantage of the price cap framework we
have developed is that it is less susceptible to manipulation
both by the utilities and by other parties, since its application
is much more objective and relies much less on information
which the utility controls ... [T]he increasingly competitive
conditions emerging ... have made the traditional regulatory
process, whose success depends on complete disclosure by the
utility of its operations and costs, more acrimonious and
litigious. Further, as competition increases, the problems we
have had in the past in conducting rate cases will become all
the more daunting. This is more than a problem of administrative convenience, since ratepayers could face unreasonably
high basic rates and competitors could suffer insufficient
projections against anticompetitive conduct. The new framework is more compatible with a mixed market in which the
utility provides some monopoly, some competitive, and some
partly competitive services, since it lessens the utility-specific
information requirements .92
The preceding quotation is instructive because it shows that
telephone companies have power to manipulate more than earnings
rates during the five years."); Petition of New Jersey Bell Telephone
Company for Approval of a Proposal for a Rate Stability Plan and Relaxed
Earnings Surveillance for Certain Competitive Services, Docket No.
T087050398 at 3-4 (N.J. BPU released June 22, 1987); Alternatives to Rate
Base Regulation of Telephone Communications Systems at the Local Exchange Company Level, 113 PUR 4th 481, 494 (Nevada PSC 1990); Experimental Plan for the Optional Regulation of Telephone Companies, 99 PUR
4th 270, 275 (Virginia PUC 1988); Proceeding on Motion of the Commission
as to the Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Rochester Telephone
Corporation, No. 89-C-022, Opinion No. 90-8 at Appendix C pp. 12,
Appendix C p. 7 ((N.Y. PSC, released February 14, 1990) RTC's responsibility to provide high-quality service is not diminished by approval of rate
agreements and remains unabated. Staff is expected to be especially vigilant
in its service oversight during the period the Agreement covers to insure
that no earnings improvements result simply from the deferral or elimination
of projects or expenses necessary at least to maintain the current quality of
service.").
92. Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 107 PUR
4th 1, 107 (California PUC 1989).
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figures; they also can manipulate the allocation of common costs. As
discussed above, one of the dangers inherent in regulation based on
cost allocation is the telephone company's ability to overallocate
common costs to noncompetitive services, thus having captive customers of noncompetitive services "subsidize" the cost of providing
competitive services. Price regulation for noncompetitive services solves
this problem because it caps noncompetitive service rates subject
generally only to inflation. Increased costs of providing noncompetitive services would have no effect on noncompetitive service rates. 93
Since increasing the cost of providing noncompetitive services would
not change the noncompetitive service rates telephone companies are
allowed to charge, telephone companies would have no incentive to
overallocate costs to noncompetitive services .4
93. Besides California, the FCC, Vermont, and Michigan approved price cap
plans at least in part because the freezing of noncompetitive service rates reduced the
risk of cross-subsidization. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6791 (1990); Investigation of the Proposed Modified
"Vermont Telecommunications Agreement," Docket No. 5293 at 21-22 (Vt. PSC
released December 30, 1988):
[G]iven the incentives rate of return creates for companies to misallocate
costs .

.

. we spend a great deal of our regulatory resources policing our

cost allocation systems. Under incentive regulation, prices would no longer
be set by reference to a set of fully distributed costs, but would be set by
reference to a formula that tracks aggregate industry costs. Incentive regulation, by in large measure removing the incentive to misallocate costs
between services, may mitigate misallocation as a regulatory concern.
See also Application of AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. for Regulation
Equivalent to That of Other Facilities-Based Interexchange Carriers in Michigan,
Case No. U-9327 at 77 (Michigan PSC, released October 1, 1990) ("Price cap
regulation also reduces a carrier's incentives to cross-subsidize competitive services
because, with an overall ceiling on prices, a carrier cannot price a service below cost
and maintain the same level of profitability by increasing other, noncompetitive
rates.")
94. If a telephone company's costs are declining, some degree of cross-subsidization can still occur because telephone companies can fail to reduce noncompetitive
service rates by the full amount of cost decreases and use this cushion to keep
competitive service rates lower than normal. To prevent this second type of crosssubsidization, virtually all price regulatory frameworks anticipate efficiency improvements and declining costs and require noncompetitive service rates to automatically
decrease each year by a "productivity factor." In California, noncompetitive service
rates must decrease each year by a 4.5 percent productivity factor. See Alternative
Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 107 PUR 4th 1 (California
PUC 1989). The FCC requires access charge rates to decrease each year by a 3.3
percent productivity factor. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786 (1990).
Idaho's alternative regulation plan uses a different method for guarding against
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IV.

RETROACTIVE REFUNDS

As discussed above, the Commission approved Illinois Bell's
alternative regulation plan in part because it permitted ratepayers to
receive retroactive refunds if Illinois Bell's return on equity became
unreasonably high. Under traditional regulation, all rate reductions
are prospective and the telephone company gets to keep 100 percent
of all excess earnings prior to the rate reduction. The benefits of
retroactive refunds have been recognized in other states. For example,
the Maryland Public Service Commission noted in approving a revenue-sharing plan that the "sharing mechanism creates a potential for
ratepayers to receive retroactive rate relief to which they otherwise
would not be entitled." 95
In the Illinois Bell case, consumer groups argued that existing
technological advances will automatically result in lower costs and it
is unfair to let Illinois Bell share cost reductions that are independent96
of any efficiency improvements Illinois Bell may make in the future.
Similarly, population growth increases demand for and revenues from
telephone service, and Illinois Bell should not share in such automatic

revenue increases. 97 While these are fair points, the administrative

costs involved in isolating automatic cost and revenue changes from
those caused by Illinois Bell would probably be so enormous as to
this second type of cross-subsidization; it requires telephone companies to refund a
larger portion of revenue growth to customers of noncompetitive services. The larger
the percentage of telephone company revenues come from noncompetitive services.
See In re Application of U S West Communications for a Rate Reduction and
Approval of a Revenue Sharing Plan for Compliance with the Cost Allocation
Provisions of Idaho Code 61-622A, Case No. MTB-T-88-13, Order No. 22738, at 812 (Idaho PUC, September 21, 1989).
95. Agreement by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company and the
Public Service Commission Proposing a Regulatory Structure for the Telephone
Company, Case No. 8274, Order No. 68957, at 26-27 (Maryland PSC, released
September 24, 1990).
96. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 106 (1989); Rob Karwath,
Bill Could End Phone Regulation, CHi. TRIB., June 24, 1990, at 1 (Chicagoland
section)
Consumer advocates, however, argued that state law required Bell to provide
phone service at the lowest possible cost. They said that if Bell could cut
costs, consumers deserved all of the savings. ...
Rates ought to be falling. What this will do is keep them from falling the
way they ought to,' said Stephen Moore, head of the Illinois Office of
Public Counsel, which represents consumers in utility cases. 'This could
result in ratepayers not seeing some of the benefits from new technology.'
97. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 109 (1989).
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outweigh the consumer benefits of receiving 100 percent of such
automatic changes.
Furthermore, Illinois Bell has a great deal to say about how
extensive the deployment of advanced technology should be, as well
as how much marketing should go into promoting increased demand
of the telephone network. 9 If ratepayers get 100 percent of all cost
reductions and revenue increases, Illinois Bell will have no incentive
to reduce costs or increase revenues and ratepayers will receive 100
percent of nothing rather than (100-x) percent of something. Both
ratepayers and telephone companies must get something if either is to
get anything. As the Virginia Public Service Commission stated in
approving an alternative regulation plan:
Benefit to shareholders is not mutually exclusive of benefit to
ratepayers, however. The additional revenues that can occur
from the introduction of new services and the aggressive
marketing of existing services may very well increase earnings
to shareholders, but are expected also to offset the need for
additional revenues from ratepayers. Moreover, the plan's
incentives for companies to increase efficiencies and thereby
enhance earnings through lowered costs should further foster
lowered costs to ratepayers. 99
V.

ILLINOIS BELL'S ELEVENTH-HOUR AMENDMENT

Consumer groups, claiming the Commission acted beyond its
statutory authority, immediately appealed the Commission's decision
approving revenue sharing for Illinois Bell. In June of the following
year (1990), Senator Richard Luft, a Democrat from Pekin, proposed
98. The FCC has noted two ways telephone companies can increase efficiency:
"Under price cap regulation, carriers have a profit-based incentive to increase
operational efficiency. In addition to cutting costs, one of the principal mechanisms
to increase efficiency is to generate additional minutes of use on the network.
Promotional offerings are one method of stimulating usage." Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 6 FCC Rcd. 665, 670 para. 47 (1991)
[hereinafter "FCC Reconsideration Order"].

99. Experimental Plan for the Optional Regulation of Telephone Companies,
99 PUR 4th 270, 272 (Virginia PUC 1988). Nevada's revenue-sharing plan authorizes
the public service commission to require that a telephone company refund 1007oof
overearnings if the Commission finds such overearnings to be "windfall profits"
which are "not attributable to the company management." Alternatives to Rate Base
Regulation of Telephone Communications Systems at the Local Exchange Company
Level, 113 PUR 4th 481, 498 (Nevada PSC 1990).
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an amendment to an obscure telephone bill dealing with 911 service. I'0
The amendment, which was written by an Illinois Bell lobbyist,
authorized the Commission to adopt alternative forms of regulation. 10'
According to Illinois Bell, the amendment merely clarified that
the Commission already possessed the authority to adopt alternative
regulation.' 0 2 According to consumer groups, the amendment was an
admission that the Commission acted beyond its authority in the
Illinois Bell case.0 3 In addition, they "objected to what they described
as an attempt to sneak a significant change into state law in the last
week of the General Assembly's spring session without public hearings.' °0 Susan Stewart, executive director of the Citizens Utility
Board, stated that the amendment "was an obvious attempt to pull a
fast one on consumers and open the door to higher local telephone
1
prices. '"05
Both Governor Jim Thompson and Commission Chairman Terrence Barnich supported the Illinois Bell amendment, arguing that
alternative regulation would improve incentives for equipment modernization.' °0 Thompson had read about the numerous other states
that had adopted alternative regulation in order to promote economic
development and thought Illinois should do the same. 07 The Senate
initially passed the amendment, 0 8 but the public controversy over the
amendment's secretive nature caused them to reconsider; on June 27
the Senate rejected the amendment by a vote of 57-0.' °9
100. Rob Karwath, Bill Could End Phone Regulation, CHI. TRIB., June 24,
1990, at 1 (Chicagoland section).
101. Paul Wagner, Consumer Groups Assail Obscure Phone Rate Bill, CHI.
TRiB., June 26, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).
102. Rob Karwath, Senate Kills Alterations in Phone Company Rules, CHI.
TUB., June 28, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).
103. Rob Karwath, Bill Could End Phone Regulation, CHI. TRB., June 24,
1990, at 1 (Chicagoland section).
104. Rob Karwath, Senate Kills Alterations in Phone Company Rules, Cm.
TRIB.,

June 28, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).

TRIB.,

June 26, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).

TRIB.,

June 28, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).

105. Rob Karwath, Consumer Groups Assail Obscure Phone Rate Bill, CHI.

106. Rob Karwath, Senate Kills Alterations in Phone Company Rules, CHI.
TRIB., June 28, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).
107. Rob Karwath, Bill Could End Phone Regulation, CHI. TRIB., June 24,
1990, at 1 (Chicagoland section).
108. Paul Wagner, Consumer Groups Assail Obscure Phone Rate Bill, Cm.
TRn., June 26, 1990, at 3 (Chicagoland section).
109. Rob Karwath, Senate Kills Alterations in Phone Company Rules, Cm.
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THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSAL

Whether the public controversy over the eleventh-hour amendment had any effect on the appeal of the Illinois Bell case is unknown.
The Illinois Appellate Court which heard the case may have interpreted the amendment as an admission that the Commission did not
have the authority under the current law to adopt alternative regulation. In any case, the Appellate Court reversed the Commission's
decision and voided the revenue-sharing plan.110 While not denying
the potential benefits of alternative regulation, the court voided the
plan on strictly statutory grounds. The court argued that Section 9244 of the Act permits only the study and not the adoption of
alternative regulation plans:
The Commission is a creature of the legislature deriving its
power and authority solely from the statute creating it, and
its acts or orders which are beyond the purview of the statute
are void. The fact that no statute precludes an agency from
taking a particular action does not mean that the authority to
do so has been given by the legislature. Here, the legislature
has directed the Commission to study incentive-based regulation and to report its findings. As a matter of statutory
construction, the expression of one thing in an enactment
excludes any other, even if there are no negative words prohibiting it. This maxim leads to the conclusion that, by authorizing only the study of incentive-based regulation, the
legislature did not intend that the Commission should undertake experimentation on its own."'
The court also noted that the revenue-sharing plan was a form of
retroactive ratemaking, which is a prohibited practice. 1 2
On the issue of competitive service rates, the court ruled that the
Commission was wrong to permit Illinois Bell to price its competitive
services at marginal cost, with no allocation of common costs."'
Conceding that Section 13-507 of the Act permits telephone companies
to price competitive service by "long-run marginal cost," the court
nevertheless held that Section 13-507's policy against cross-subsidiza-

110. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 561 N.E. 2d
426 (I11.App. 1990).
111. Id. at 436 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 436.
113. Id. at 439.
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tion mandated that competitive service rates include an allocation of
common costs."14
VII.

THE BLUE RIBBON TELECOMMUNICATIONS TASK FORCE REPORT

The Commission decided not to appeal the appellate court reversal and instead concentrated on the work of the Blue Ribbon Telecommunications Task Force ("Task Force"), which it established
soon after the rejection of the eleventh-hour amendment. The Task
Force's mission was to conduct an "independent analysis of the state
of telecommunications in Illinois" and to "recommend possible improvements to that law to the Commission.""' 5
The Task Force was co-chaired by George Stigler, Nobel laureate
and University of Chicago economics professor, and Marcus Alexis,
former member of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Northwestern University economic professor. The co-chairs set up four
working groups to deal with four issue areas: (1) evaluation of rateof-return regulation and alternatives to rate-of-return regulation; (2)
technology; (3) consumer and public interest issues; and (4) small
telephone company and rural issues. Interested parties were invited to
attend and participate in any of the working group discussions. The
purpose of the working groups was not to formulate recommendations
but to outline the issues and the positions of the various interested
parties.
The working groups met throughout September and October. On
October 29, 1990, the working groups presented their findings of 1990
to the Task Force at the Illinois Telecommunications Sunset Review
Forum ("Forum") held at Northwestern University. After the Forum,
the Task Force met four more times before issuing their recommendations to the Commission in January of this year. The Task Force
recommendations included the following:
1. The Commission should have the authority to adopt alternative forms of regulation for noncompetitive services,
including retroactive ratemaking, revenue sharing, and price
6
regulation;"
2. price regulation is the preferred method for regulating
noncompetitive services;" 7
114. Id.
115. Task Force Report, supra note 18, at 1.

116. Id. at 7.

117. Id. at 30-31.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

3. competitive services should be completely deregulated, with
none of the revenues from competitive service used to
subsidize the provision of noncompetitive services;" 8
4. the allocation of common costs is "arbitrary" and the new
telecommunications law should reject the appellate court
ruling that a portion of common costs must be allocated
to competitive services in order to prevent cross-subsidization." 9
The Task Force justified its recommendations by stating that
"[s]everal other state commissions over the past few years have
outpaced the Illinois commission in developing forward-looking rulemakings and multiyear regulatory plans' '1 20 and "[s]ociety and the
economy in Illinois could be fundamentally harmed if it lacks plans
to deploy advanced technology and if it restricts incentives to deploy
advanced technology by continuing to rely on outmoded regulatory
mechanisms .
*."..
,,2 While the Task Force admitted that its recommendations could allow telephone companies to exploit their monopoly power, it concluded that "tardy adoption of improved technology
is likely to be more costly to citizens of Illinois than temporary
exercises of monopoly power."1 22
VIII.

REACTION OF THE CONSUMER GROUPS

The consumer groups reacted angrily to the Task Force Report.
In its comments to the Commission, the Office of Public Counsel
criticized the composition of the Task Force:
[T]he background and experience of the individuals chosen
left consumer representatives with little hope that the final
product would fairly recognize, let alone reflect, consumers[']
interests. For example, the former chair of the Task Force,
who ultimately resigned in October is a registered lobbyist for
Ameritech, the regional holding company of Illinois Bell Telephone Company. Another member, until a few months ago,
was a registered lobbyist for Central Telephone Company of
Illinois. The credentials of the other members of the Task
force, while no doubt impressive, hardly contributed to the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

34.
32.
10-11.
35.
35-36.
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formation of an impartial or balanced panel. Indeed, not a
single representative of telephone users, interexchange carriers
or other entities in competition with local exchange companies
was assigned to the Task Force. .

.

.It therefore appears that

the criteria for appointment to the Task Force were either a
connection with local exchange carriers or a distaste for reg23
ulation.
In its comments, the Citizens Utility Board quoted Commission
Chairman Terrence Barnich as saying that the Commission "ison
people
record as supporting incentive regulation and therefore wanted
1 24
position."
Commission's
the
with
agreed
who
on the panel
Besides the composition of the Task Force, the two other major
criticisms of the Report dealt with the recommendations to permit
alternative regulation for noncompetitive services and deregulation of
competitive services. As discussed above, the consumer groups did
not think the Commission had proven a need for alternative regulation
of noncompetitive services. The issue of the deregulation of competitive services is discussed below.
DEREGULATION OF COMPETITIVE SERVICES

As discussed above, the appellate court voided Illinois Bell's
alternative regulation plan partly because it did not allocate any
portion of common costs to competitive services. Not only did the
Task Force Report recommend against any allocation of common
costs, 125 it went further and recommended that competitive services
be completely deregulated and that the Commission not be able to
use competitive revenues to subsidize noncompetitive service rates.
I.

MARGINAL COST PRICING V. ALLOCATION OF COMMON COSTS

The argument in favor of long-run marginal cost pricing of
competitive services is that allocating common costs is inherently
123. OPC Comments, supra note 20, at 1-2.
124. CUB Comments, supra note 58, at 2 n.l.

125. The Task Force Report argued that requiring competitive service rates to
equal at least long-run marginal cost guards against cross-subsidization because it
assures that competitive service rates will make a "contribution toward the common
costs ... of the firm ....

."

Task Force Report, supra note 18, at 33. Actually, a

contribution will occur only if competitive service rates are above long-run marginal
cost because Illinois Bell's definition of long-run marginal cost excludes common
costs. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Even if telephone companies decide
to price competitive services somewhere above long-run marginal cost, there is no
guarantee that the contribution made to common costs will be sufficient to cover
competitive services' fair share of common costs.
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arbitrary because it is impossible to allocate common costs accurately. 126 As the Washington Commission has stated:
The search for the "proper" method of allocating costs is an
effort that has consumed literally decades of work by both
the FCC and state regulatory commissions-with no concrete
results. There are a vast number of methodologies available
to allocate costs among services. . . . [In one electric utility
rate case a witness testified to the existence of at least 29
different methods of apportioning costs among services on a
fully distributed basis.'

27

A telephone company must recover its costs of providing services
through the prices it charges for those services. There is a great danger
that competitive services will receive an overallocation of common
costs, which would place regulated telephone companies at a pricing
disadvantage vis-a-vis its unregulated competitors, who do not face
the possibility of an overallocation. Overallocating common costs to
a telephone company's competitive services may increase the telephone
126. For purposes of discussion, I will use Illinois Bell's definition of long-run
marginal cost, which excludes common costs. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
127. Washington Utilities & Transportation Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest Bell
Telephone Co., Docket No. U-89-3245-P, Fourth Supplemental Order, at 27-28 &
n.1 (Wash. UTC, released January 16, 1990) (rejecting a "standard" cost allocation
methodology for telecommunications and ruling that the Commission would review
the appropriateness of a particular cost allocation methodology on a "case-by-case
basis").
The Oregon Public Utility Commission has adopted long-run marginal cost
pricing for competitive services, stating: "Although numerous methods have been
devised, the fact is that there is no 'correct' method of allocating common costs.
Because of the subjectivity inherent in such analyses, the 'cost' assigned to a given
service may vary substantially depending on the study selected." Pacific Northwest
Bell Telephone Company d/b/a U S West Communications, 114 PUR 4th 299, 310
(Oregon PUC 1990) (hereinafter "Oregon Decision"].
The New York Public Service Commission has ruled that prices for competitive
services must fall "somewhere in between" long-run marginal cost and fully allocated
cost. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules
and Regulations of New York Telephone Company, No. 90-C-0191, Opinion No. 914 at 243 (NY PSC, March 7, 1991).
The Nevada Public Service Commission has adopted long-run marginal cost as
the price floor for competitive services but "expects that local exchange companies
will price their discretionary and competitive services to make a contribution to
overhead ....

."

Alternatives to Rate Base Regulation of Telephone Communications

Systems at the Local Exchange Company Level, 113 PUR 4th 481, 488 (Nevada PSC
1990).
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company's costs of providing competitive services above those of its
unregulated competitors. This may force the telephone company to

raise its prices for all of its competitive services above what the market
will bear, resulting in customers buying these services elsewhere and
the telephone company losing its share of the entire competitive

services market. Without competitive service revenues to help contribute to cost recovery, the telephone company's captive consumers of

noncompetitive services would be left to pick up the tab, not only for

all of the telephone company's common costs, but perhaps also for

the direct costs associated with the telephone company's failed venture

into the competitive services marketplace.
Thus, allocating common costs to competitive services in an effort
to prevent both cross-subsidization and the raising of noncompetitive
service rates can backfire if an overallocation of common costs to
competitive services occurs. Ironically, an overallocation may cause
noncompetitive service rates to be higher than they otherwise would
be if telephone companies were not required to allocate common costs
competitive services anywhere at or above
and were permitted to price
12
long-run marginal cost.

1

128. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges,
Rules and Regulations of New York Telephone Company, No. 90-C-0191, Opinion
No. 91-4 at 242-433 (NY PSC, March 7, 1991) ("Where a competitive service remains
regulated, it makes sense to price it to maximize profits, even if this means monopoly
services picking up part of what might otherwise be considered the competitive
service's fair share of joint and common costs."); Hillman, supra note 8, at 1209
("The strategy ...

for the firm, and presumably for regulators as well, is to depart

from the principle of full cost pricing in competitive markets. The aim in these
markets should now be to recover the maximum revenues possible in excess of directly
attributable costs ....

[T]o the extent that the firm can generate revenues in com-

petitive markets above its directly attributable costs, consumers in the monopoly
markets benefit by being relieved of the need to meet that added increment of joint
and common costs.").
Cf. MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1124 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). For purposes of determining what price floor is needed
to prevent predatory pricing and antitrust violations, the court rejected a fully
distributed cost ("FDC") pricing methodology for similar reasons:
If AT&T were forced to price at FDC levels in competitive markets, its
monopoly customers would probably be worse rather than better off.
Because of the elasticity of demand in competitive markets, any rate
substantially above [long-run incremental cost] would cause AT&T to lose
business against an equally efficient competitor and, hence, decrease AT&T's
total revenue from competitive markets. There would thus be less revenue
available from competitive services to contribute to the firm's joint or
common costs, and monopoly customers would be required to provide a
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Fearing cross-subsidization and higher than necessary noncompetitive service rates, the consumer groups strongly opposed the Task
Force Report's recommendation to deregulate competitive service
revenues and eliminate the allocation of a portion of common costs
to competitive services.' 2 9 While most argued for cost allocation
without even addressing the Task Force concern that allocating common costs is arbitrary, the Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") admitted the problem but concluded that "rational allocations must be
made despite the perceived difficulty of following strict economic
principles."' 30
Even if the allocation of common costs to competitive services
as a group is performed accurately, requiring telephone companies to
allocate mechanically equal portions of common costs to each competitive service offering could result in an overallocation on the
individual service level. In fact, a service-by-service cost allocation
greater share of these costs.
The court noted that its holding applied only to antitrust law; it conceded that the
FCC had the administrative authority to require that competitive services as a whole
recover their full share of common costs for purposes of insuring reasonable
noncompetitive service rates. See MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1125, n.62 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
129. The threat of cross-subsidization is especially great when both competitive
service revenues are deregulated and no allocation of common costs is made to
competitive services. The issue of allocating common costs to competitive services is
much less important provided competitive service revenues remain in regulated
accounts. See infra note 146.
130. OPC Comments, supra note 20, at 5.
Accord Telpak, supra note 24, at 1174-75 paragraph 142 (.'[Y]ou will turn to the
cost experts and probably ask for the unit cost of producing each product in
question.... There will be plenty of headaches in aiming at any sort of figure. For
example, how shall the administrative and plant overhead costs be allocated between
different products? Or if a given process simultaneously creates joint products like
meat and hides, how shall the costs be allocated between them? . . .Headaches, or

no headaches, it is the duty of the accountants to come out with some sort of answer
as to unit costs."') (citing PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS at 510-11 (1st ed. 1951)).
Many states that completely deregulate competitive service revenues prohibit the
subsidization of competitive services by noncompetitive services. See, e.g., GA. CODE

ANN. § 46-2-23(g) (Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.103b(3)(1987, Supp. 1991)

(repealed 1992); MINN. STAT. § 237.62(1)(3), (2) (Supp. 1991); Alternatives to Rate
Base Regulation of Telephone Communications Systems at the Local Exchange
Company Level, 113 PUR 4th 481, 488 (Nevada PSC 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4921-02.2 (1960, Supp. 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 759.030(5) (1989, Supp. 1990);
Experimental Plan for the Optional Regulation of Telephone Companies, 99 PUR
4th 270, 275 (Virginia PUC 1988); W. VA. CODE § 24-2-3c(b) (Supp. 1991); Wis.
STAT. § 196.195(9) (1990).
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would be far more arbitrary than a one-time allocation of common
costs to competitive services as a group. According to Peter Huber,
noted consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice, service-by-service
cost allocations increase the margin of error by many times:
Cost separation is a torture of a thousand cuts....
...Each slicing operation involves a measure of discretion.
The discretionary judgments at each tier of the dismemberment
multiply. After four of five cuts, discretion has been raised to
the fourth of fifth order. If there is a 20 percent discretion as
to just where each cost cut will be made, there is 250 percent
discretion as to the size of each small piece that finally
emerges.'

Overallocating common costs to particular competitive services
could severely cripple the ability of telephone companies to offer
particular competitive services at market prices. In numerous proceedings before the Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois Bell has argued
in favor of allocating common costs to competitive services as a
group, rather than requiring telephone companies to incorporate a
portion of common costs into the long-run marginal cost studies of
each individual competitive service. According to Illinois Bell, certain
competitive services are able to make a larger contribution to common
costs than others. Telephone companies are in the best position to
read the market and know how much they can price particular
competitive services above their respective long-run marginal costs. If
the Illinois Commerce Commission does not give regulated telephone
companies the same pricing flexibility possessed by their unregulated
competitors, Illinois Bell argues that telephone companies may be
forced to price particular competitive services above market. The
result would be that the "local exchange company loses the competitive service revenue in total.' ' 2 The Illinois Commerce Commission
131. Alexander Larson, Cost Allocations, Predation, and Cross-Subsidies in
TeleCommunications, 14 J. CORP. LAW 377, 391 (1989) (citing P. HUBER, THE
GEODESIC NETwoRK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY §§

3.50-.55 (1987).
132. Brief on Exceptions of Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Proposed Reclassification of Operator Assistance Services and Increase in Calling Card Service Charges,
Docket No. 90-0264, at 10 (filed April 2, 1991).
Both the FCC and the Michigan Public Service Commission, while believing that
competitive services as a group should be required to recover their full allocation of
common costs, agree with Illinois Bell that telephone companies should be allowed
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in the Illinois Bell remand proceeding recently adopted Illinois Bell's
position, stating that allocating common costs to competitive services
as a group is a "reasonable way to proceed."'3 3
A.

PRICE REGULATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR COST ALLOCATION

Implementing price regulation for noncompetitive services could,
if noncompetitive service rates were established at the right level,
eliminate all potential for cross-subsidization since telephone companies could not raise noncompetitive service rates to compensate for
artificially low competitive service rates.13 4
to price individual competitive services anywhere at or above long-run marginal cost.
The Michigan Public Service Commission states:
While long-run incremental costs may be an appropriate yardstick for
judging individual competitive service pricing and are used by new entrants
into the competitive markets, we believe that fully-allocated embedded costs
are the only appropriate costs for determining recovery of a large embedded
investment base....
... The Commission finds that it is appropriate to continue use of longrun incremental cost floors where competition is proven for an individual
service, as long as the over-all broad service category covers its fully-allocated
embedded costs.
Application of AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. for Regulation Equivalent
to That of Other Facilities-Based Interexchange Carriers in Michigan, Case No. U9327 at 51-52 (Michigan PSC, released October 1, 1990); see also Separation of Costs
of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of Nonregulated Activities, 2 FCC Rcd.
1298, 1313 paragraph 115 (1987) ("We can avoid becoming involved in nonregulated
pricing matters by treating the regulated and nonregulated sectors of [a] company's
business in the aggregate for purposes of allocating costs.") [hereinafter Cost
Allocation Plan].
133. See Illinois Bell Telephone - Proposed Restructuring and Increase of
Rates, Docket No. 89-0033, on remand, Order at 196 (Ill.
Comm. Comm'n, adopted
November 4, 1991) (hereinafter, Remand Order).
134. The problem is that it is impossible to know what the correct level for
noncompetitive service rates should be if no allocation of common costs between
noncompetitive and competitive services is performed. Using existing rates as the
benchmark beginning rates is one solution because a public utility commission
presumably conducted a cost allocation analysis before approving them initially.
However, existing rates may have been in effect for many years, thus making the
cost allocations they were initially based on obsolete and inaccurate.
In adopting price regulation for AT&T, the FCC's solution to the problem was
to use existing rates as the beginning rate. The FCC rejected the call to establish
beginning rates by means of a new cost allocation rate case because "it would prolong
arbitrary cost allocation methodologies and delay the benefits of incentive regulation." FCC Reconsideration Order, supra note 98, at 677 paragraph 102.
Others are not as trusting of existing rates. South Dakota requires its public
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Prior to adopting price regulation for AT&T, the FCC required
AT&T to allocate a portion of common costs to its competitive
services by means of a fully distributed cost methodology.'" In
rejecting AT&T's call for long-run marginal cost pricing of competitive services, the FCC held that it was "patently discriminatory" to
require that customers of noncompetitive services pay for all common
costs while customers of competitive services only have to pay long13 6

run marginal cost.
With the adoption of price regulation, the FCC maintained the
requirement that common costs be allocated between competitive and
noncompetitive services,' 37 but noted the reduced importance of cost
allocation under price regulation:
"Currently, [AT&T's] rates to a large extent reflect our reliance on fully distributed costing, the traditional regulatory
tool used to guard against cross-subsidy. Incentive regulation,
with its primary focus on prices, permits us to move away
from the use of fully distributed costing, and toward a more
economically efficient set of prices." 3 "
B. SEPARATE SUBSIDIARIES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR COST
ALLOCATION

Besides price regulation, another way out of the allocation morass
is to eliminate the "dual nature" of regulated telephone companies
utility commission, in establishing noncompetitive service rates under price regulation,
to consider anew the portion of common costs properly "distributed" to noncom-

petitive services. See S.D.
161.

CODIF1ED LAWS ANN.

§ 49-31-1.4. (Supp. 1991).

135. See Cost Allocation Plan, supra note 132, at 1312, 1318 paragraphs 109,

136. See Telpak, supra note 24, at 1166 paragraph 122.
137. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC Rcd.
2873, 3135 para. 544 (1989). The FCC maintained the cost allocation requirement
because its price regulation plan included revenue-sharing. An integral part of revenue
sharing is the authorized rate of return for regulated services above which AT&T
must share earnings. Measuring the rate of return earned on regulated services
requires a measurement of the cost of providing regulated services, and an accurate
cost measurement requires an allocation of common costs between regulated and
unregulated services.
138. Id. at 2924 paragraph 105. See also FCC Reconsideration Order, supra
note 98, at 678 paragraph 110 ("[O]ne of the fundamental objectives of price cap
regulation is the elimination of artificial cost allocation requirements and their effect
on prices."). For a discussion of the problems associated with cost allocation and
the role price regulation can play in ameliorating them, see Mark Meitzen, Shared
Costs and the Cash Cow Debate: Who Gets Milked?, PUBLIC UTILITIEs FORTNIGHTLY
at 32 (April 1, 1991).
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by requiring them to spin off their competitive services into a separate
subsidiary. Separate subsidiaries are exactly that: separate. Both the
competitive service subsidiary and the noncompetitive service subsidiary have their own equipment, and no equipment is jointly utilized.
The advantage of "separateness" is that there are no common costs
and the threat of anticompetitive cross-subsidization disappears. The
disadvantage of "separateness" is that it creates inefficiencies, because
redundant equipment and overhead that are not necessary for providing the service must be bought. In addition, separation increases the
costs of connecting competitive services with noncompetitive services
because the two services are no longer co-existing under one roof.
Section 13-508 of the Act authorizes the Illinois Commerce Commission to order separate subsidiaries if:
(a) no less costly means is available and effective in fully and
properly identifying and allocating costs between such
carrier's competitive and noncompetitive telecommunications services; and
(b) the incremental cost of establishing and maintaining such
subsidiary would not require increases in rates or charges
to levels which would effectively preclude the offer or
provision of the affected competitive telecommunications
service. 119
The Commission has never utilized this Section, because it has concluded that the increased costs and reduced efficiencies caused by
state-imposed structural separation were too great. In the Illinois Bell
remand proceeding, the Illinois Commerce Commission recently rejected the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that Illinois Bell be
required to show cause why its competitive services should not be
place in a separate subsidiary. The Commission determined that a
cost-allocation methodology based on relative long-run marginal coast
would adequately guard against cross-subsidization. 4°
The FCC has flip-flopped on the issue of separate subsidiaries.
Initially, the FCC favored separate subsidiaries over the accounting
safeguard of cost allocation:
While accounting has always been a fundamental tool utilized
by this Commission in the exercise of our statutory responsibilities, its use has by no means been recognized as a substitute
139. Act at § 13-508.
140. See, Remand Order, supra note 133, at 205.
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for structural separation. .

.

.Where a carrier has the incentive

and ability to engage in sustained cross-subsidization, or predatory pricing, accounting may be employed to assist in the
identification of such practices, but it cannot prevent the
misallocation of joint and common costs associated with the
provision of [noncompetitive] and [competitive] services if
provided by the same entity. On the other hand, the separation
requirement serves as a structural check on the proper allocation of costs between [noncompetitive] and [competitive] services. 141
In 1981, the year after the FCC's Computer II decision, the
Comptroller General of the United States issued a report critical of
the separate subsidiary requirement. The report argued that if a
company is intent upon engaging in anticompetitive cross-subsidization, a separate subsidiary requirement will not stop it because it can
treat the subsidiaries as a single entity. Policing the "separateness"
of the subsidiaries is just as time-consuming and costly as policing
the appropriate allocation of common costs and thus the separate
subsidiary requirement solves nothing. As the Comptroller General's
report stated:
Separate subsidiaries, because they solve little or nothing in
themselves, imply a continuing and intensive regulatory effort,
including a heavy reliance on the very cost allocation, accounting, and auditing techniques which have proven so troublesome, difficult, and inadequate in the past

. . .

as a means of

preventing cross-subsidization of competitive offerings. Imposing a separate subsidiary requirement on a dominant firm
does little or nothing to alter the incentives of the overall firm
significantly
or make the incentives of the separate subsidiary
142
different from those of the corporate parent.
141. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 464 paragraph 210 (1980) [hereinafter

"Computer I'].
142. See Eli M. Noam, A Special Symposium: The New Technology in the
Communications Industry: Legal Problems in a Brave New World: Federal and State
Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of Deregulation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 949,

970 (1983) (citing General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, Legislative and Regulatory Actions Needed to
Deal with a Changing Domestic Telecommunications Industry (1981)).
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In 1986, the FCC changed its mind and decided accounting
safeguards were the way to go:
The relative costs and benefits of the structural separation
requirements now imposed . . .compared with the costs and
benefits of non-structural safeguards designed to serve the
same regulatory goals, lead us to conclude that the structural
requirements should be eliminated. . . . We find that for the
provision of [competitive] services, the costs from the structural separation in lost innovation and inefficiency render these
requirements far less desirable than non-structural safeguards. 41
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the FCC's
Computer III decision, ruling that the FCC had not adequately
justified its "change of heart" regarding separate subsidiaries. The
court ordered the FCC to rethink the issue and come to a decision
based on a more complete factual record. 1" The FCC recently finished
rethinking the issue and came to the same conclusion: cost allocation
safeguards are preferable to separate subsidiaries. 145
The problems associated with the allocation of common costs are
maddening and incapable of satisfactory resolution. In cases where
neither price regulation nor separate subsidiaries are utilized, regulators are damned if they allocate and damned if they don't. Attempting
an allocation risks rendering regulated telephone companies uncompetitive by means of an overallocation or an allocation based on
outdated costs. Failure to allocate jeopardizes competition by giving
regulated telephone companies the ability to cross-subsidize and gain
an unfair cost advantage over their competitors.
II.

REMOVING COMPETITIVE REVENUE FROM REGULATED ACCOUNTS

The argument in favor of removing competitive revenues from
regulated accounts is increased competition in the marketplace. As

143. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1011-12 (1986), rev'd sub nom.
California v. F.C.C., 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter "Computer IIr'].
144. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1238-39, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990).
145. Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards,
Report and Order, 1991 FCC LEXIS 6591, FCC 91-381, Docket No. 90-623 (FCC,
Released December 20, 1991).
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discussed above, the current telephone law partly takes account of
increased competition by permitting telephone companies the flexibility to offer competitive services at whatever price the market dictates.
If a service is truly competitive, keeping competitive revenue in
regulated accounts will serve no purpose; the market price will yield
competitive revenues sufficient only to cover the costs of providing
the service and there will normally not be any excess profits available
to subsidize residential noncompetitive service rates.
In those rare instances where a technological breakthrough in the
development of a competitive-service offering yields large profits for
a telephone company, it is argued that the telephone company must
be able to keep those profits in order to promote competition by
providing it with the same financial incentives available to nonregulated competitors. Without equal incentives, regulated telephone
companies will lag behind their competitors in providing competitive
services, large business users will bypass the public network and use
the more advanced networks of competitors, and the loss of business
revenue will force regulated telephone companies to increase noncom47
This argument has
petitive service rates in order to recoup the loss.
proved persuasive because at least 17 states (Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West
146. See Task Force Report, supra note 18, at 34. According to the Task Force
Report, removing competitive service revenues from regulated accounts would promote competition because it would "place a regulated carrier on the same footing as
its unregulated competitors with respect to the risks of competitive ventures." Id.
147. An accurate allocation of common costs to competitive services becomes
much more important once competitive revenues are removed from regulated accounts. Deregulation means that excess competitive revenues caused by an underallocation of common costs can no longer be used to subsidize noncompetitive service
rates and thereby compensate noncompetitive ratepayers for the underallocation. As
the New York Public Service Commission has noted:
[There is] a big difference in whether the [competitive] services in question
are part of regulated operations or are deregulated ....

[1In the latter case

the concern over subsidization by regulated monopoly services is acute
because monopoly services would have no way of getting back or benefiting
from any such subsidy flows. But where the services in question are
competitive but still regulated ...

every added dollar of revenue gained will

redound to the benefit of monopoly ratepayers, so they can recoup any
ostensible subsidy.
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules and
Regulations of New York Telephone Company, No. 90-C-0191, Opinion No. 91-4 at
226 (NY PSC, March 7, 1991).
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Virginia, and Wisconsin) provide for the complete deregulation of
48
competitive service revenues. 1
While consumer groups and telephone company competitors such
as Metropolitan Fiber Systems ("MFS") and MCI do not dispute the
logic of this argument, they are concerned that many services will be
deregulated which are not truly competitive. 149 The Office of Public
Counsel argues that competitive services comprise only 4 percent of
Illinois Bell's revenues and less than 1 percent of Contel's revenues.' 50
148. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 40-15-305(1)(a), 40-15-401 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. §
46-2-23(b)(1) (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-16.9 (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE §

476.1 (Supp. 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 484.103(b)(2) (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 237.60(1) (Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-807(1) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §
704.040(3) (1986 & Supp. 1989); Petition of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company
for Approval of a Proposal for a Rate Stability Plan and Relaxed Earnings Surveillance for Certain Competitive Services, Docket No. T087050398 (N.J. BPU released
June 22, 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-02.1(1) (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4927.03(A)(1) (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 759.030(2) (Supp. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 49-31-3.2, 49-31-1.3 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 548b-3 (Supp. 1990); Experimental Plan for the Optional Regulation of Telephone
Companies, 99 PUR 4th 270, 273; W. VA. CODE § 24-2-3(c)(a) (Supp. 1990); Wis.
STAT. §§ 196.81(1), 196.195(3)(b) (Supp. 1990).
149. See Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corporation on Report of the
Blue Ribbon Telecommunications Task Force at 8 (Jan. 21, 1991) ("[Ilt is quite
possible that many, if not most, of the [telephone company] services that are currently
designated 'competitive' by the Commission are not truly competitive. The requirements for classifying a service as competitive or noncompetitive should be subject to
increased scrutiny by the Commission, whether through drafting of stronger statutory
safeguards or by stricter enforcement of current laws.").
See also Statement of Metropolitan Fiber Systems of Chicago, Inc. to the Illinois
Commerce Commission Blue Ribbon Telecommunications Task Force at 31-32 (October 22, 1990) [hereinafter "MFS Statement"]. Metropolitan Fiber Systems of
Chicago, Inc. (hereinafter MFS) argues that the current definition of "competitive
service" in Section 13-502 of the Act as "reasonably available from more than one
provider" is insufficient to insure that customers can get the service on equal quality,
quantity, and price terms. Therefore, MFS recommends that the new telephone law
permit aservice to be classified as "competitive" only if: "(1) entry into the market
for the service is unimpeded by legal, technical, or economic restraints; (2) there are
economically viable competitors who provide the service and who have substantial
market shares, and (3) that like services are available at comparable rates and terms."
Id.
150. OPC Comments, supra note 20, at 8. The number of competitive services
offered by regulated telephone companies in other states also appears to be limited.
See, e.g., Application of AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. for Regulation
Equivalent to That of Other Facilities-Based Interexchange Carriers in Michigan,
Case No. U-9327 at 42 (Michigan PSC, released October 1, 1990) ("[A]U of Michigan
Bell's and GTE's services are not yet fully competitive. In fact, most of their services
are monopolistic.").
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The Citizens Utility Board argues that those services which have been
classified as competitive "still rely on access to the local network in
order to complete the calls."''

Thus, the regulated telephone com-

panies can still reap monopoly profits by not permitting the services
offered by competitors to interconnect with the public network on

equal terms with its own services. 52 In October, 1990, MFS argued
that regulated telephone companies should

be required to enter into agreements to interconnect its network
on reasonable technical and economic terms. In this way,

[telephone company] control of the monopoly portions of a
"competitive" service cannot be used to thwart the development of competition for that service. " '
Regulated telephone companies argue that local exchange competition has dramatically increased and will soon encompass virtually
all services. 5 4 Telephone companies are not against local competition
151. CUB Joint Committee Comments, supra note 20, at 2. Dr. Marvin Kahn,
an economist testifying on behalf of the Citizens Utility Board, stated that
Illinois Bell has bottleneck control over the network; that local exchange
companies ("LECs") have the only ubiquitous communications network
currently in place in Illinois; .

.

. that virtually all non-LEC providers must

use the LEC networks to reach the residential and business customer
population; that the non-LEC provider or its customers must take service
from the LEC before it can compete with the LEC; and that this is one
source of the bottleneck and the associated market power ....

[Wihere

there is this type of bottleneck monopoly control the existence of alternative
suppliers does not necessarily result in effective competition ....
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 104 (1989).
152. Section 13-405 of the Act authorizes the Commission to permit competition
in the local market. Pursuant to this Section, the Commission has authorized Teleport
Communications to compete with Illinois Bell. See Teleport Communications Chicago: Application for a Certificate of Service Authority to Provide Direct Nonswitched Access Service, No. 89-0171 (Ill. Comm. Comm'n, Sept. 22, 1989). However,
Teleport has only been able to compete effectively in the area of providing telephone
lines between large business offices. Illinois Bell continues to possess a monopoly in
serving small business and residential users ("Local Loop"). The only way to break
this monopoly is to get Illinois Bell to sell to competitors access to its Local Loop
(i.e., interconnection) at reasonable wholesale prices so that they can resell this access
to small business and residential users at retail prices comparable to those charged
by Illinois Bell itself.

153. MFS Statement, supra note 149, at 32.
154. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 104 (1989).
("[Illinois Bell]'s assessment [is] that all Illinois Bell services are or will be competitive
with the possible exception of network access to residential and small business
customers."); Forbes Article, supra note 30, at 118-19 ("An onslaught of new
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provided that competitors are subject to the same regulatory burdens
and obligations to which regulated companies are subjected. State
regulators require that telephone companies comply with costly accounting procedures and serve low-density rural areas with small, if
any, profit margins. It is not fair to let competitors such as MFS
"cream-skim" by offering service only to high-profit large business
users while requiring regulated telephone companies to expend resources serving the low-profit segments of the market. Higher profit
margins would permit competitors to invest in and modernize their
networks faster than the regulated telephone companies and could
result in telephone companies losing the fight for large business users.
Southern Bell Telephone, a large regulated telephone company, recently filed comments in a Georgia regulatory proceeding and stated:
Southern Bell is not opposed to new competition provided it
is allowed to meet that competition on fair and equitable
terms. Southern Bell is opposed to disparate regulatory treatment among competitors. Clearly, if [competitors] are allowed
to provide telecommunications service, they should be subject
to the same rules, requirements and obligations as the local
exchange companies and [long-distance] carriers are today.
These obligations should extend to providing support for
universal service. . . .MFS acknowledges that it is interested
in providing end user loop facilities, targeting large metropolitan areas rather than the extensive suburban and rural areas
which the LECs are obligated to serve.' 55
The "reasonable" interconnection arrangements MFS
ommended that should be required are coming true without
in the Illinois telephone law. 5 6 On February 27, 1991,
Communications and Illinois Bell reached agreement on

has reca change
Teleport
such an

technologies, hungry entrepreneurs and pro-competition regulators are all teaming up
to bring lower communications rates and all manner of new services that will-over

the next decade-explode the old-fashioned monopolies. The fuse is lit .... Com-

petitive forces are only starting to be felt now in local service. If nothing else happens,
the competitors could quite possibly siphon off an estimated $5 billion in revenues
from the telephone companies by the end of this decade."); Business Week Article,
supra note 30, at 96.

155. Comments of Southern Bell Telephone Co. on Georgia Telecom 2000 Issues

at 33, 35 (Dec. 20, 1990).
156. The Task Force Report recommends that the new telephone law authorize
the Commission to promote competition by "various methods including: Requiring
carriers to [sell] their service offerings [separately] and to interconnect them on terms
consistent with competition." Task Force Report, supra note 18, at 9.
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interconnection arrangement.'

Under the arrangement, Teleport gets

access to the local public telephone network at a cost comparable to
that incurred by Illinois Bell's own access services. As part of the
agreement, Teleport agreed to pay a "contribution element" to Illinois
Bell that considers the regulatory costs Illinois Bell faces. While the
interconnection arrangement applies only to high-speed data transfers,
and thus does not affect residential customers, it marks the beginning
of the end for monopoly control over the local public telephone
network. "
CONCLUSION
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION

The rewrite of the Illinois telecommunications law should provide
the Commission with the authority to adopt alternative regulation
plans, including revenue-sharing and price regulation plans, if it finds
such plans to be in the public interest. Between revenue sharing and
price regulation, price regulation appears to be the better form of
alternative regulation because it both eliminates the administrative
costs associated with monitoring revenue-sharing calculations and
eliminates the opportunity and incentive for telephone companies to
overallocate costs to their noncompetitive rate bases and cross-subsidize.
While the data is not all in, what data there is (the FCC, Alabama,
Idaho, Kentucky, New York, Wisconsin) suggests that alternative
157. See Jon Van, Bell Agrees to Hookups with Data-Transfer Rivals, Cm.

TprB., Feb. 28, 1991, at 2 (Business Section). Pursuant to a petition by MFS, the
FCC has proposed a rule requiring that local telephone companies interconnect with
competing local carriers on nondiscriminatory terms for the purpose of transporting
the high-speed data traffic of businesses between the wire centers of long distance
companies such as MCI and the wire centers of local telephone companies. The FCC
is also considering requiring the same nondiscriminatory interconnections for the
purpose of transporting the voice traffic of residential customers. See In re Expanded
Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C. Rcd. 3259 (1991).
158. The Act prohibits discrimination in at least five different places-Sections
13-702 (prohibits discrimination), 8-101 (prohibits discrimination), 9-241 (prohibits
discriminatory rates), 9-101 (reasonable rates), and 8-506 (reasonable interconnection
arrangements). Illinois Bell only agreed to the reasonable interconnection arrangement
after Teleport filed a complaint with the Commission. The complaint alleged that
Illinois Bell's refusal to agree to a reasonable interconnection arrangement violated
the Act's anti-discrimination provisions. See "Complaint of Teleport Communications
Chicago, Inc.," Teleport Communications Chicago, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., No. 90-0462 at 8 (Il1. Comm. Comm'n, Dec. 12, 1990).
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regulation provides telephone companies with increased incentives for
efficiency while at the same time protecting ratepayers through revenue
sharing or price cap frameworks. As Commissioner Manshio stated
in the Illinois Bell case, alternative regulation is a "worthy experiment
.. with potential economic benefits inuring to Illinois Bell customers.''1 59
This is not to say that the new telephone law should encourage
or require the Commission to adopt alternative regulation plans, but
the authority should exist. In addition, telephone companies should
6
be allowed to opt out of alternative regulation if they so desire.' 0
SAFEGUARDS

At the same time, the new telecommunications law should impose
safeguards to insure that the New York Telephone nightmare does
not happen in Illinois. The Commission should be required to consider
many factors before approving an alternative regulation plan. One
possible list is that found in the Washington statute:
[T]he Commission shall consider, in determining the appropriateness of any proposed alternative form of regulation,
whether it will:
(a) Reduce regulatory delay and costs;
(b) Encourage innovation in services;
(c) Promote efficiency;
(d) Facilitate the broad dissemination of technological improvements to all classes of ratepayers;
(e) Enhance the ability of telecommunications companies to
respond to competition;
(f) Ensure that telecommunications companies do not have
the opportunity to exercise substantial market power absent
effective competition or effective regulatory constraints;
and
161
(g) Provide fair, just, and reasonable rates for all ratepayers.
In addition, the authorizing statute should require that the Commission find that a particular alternative regulation plan benefits
ratepayers generally and protects service quality particularly before
159. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 108 PUR 4th 89, 203 (1989).
160. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.135(4) (1990) ("Not later than sixty
days from the entry of the commission's order, the company may file with the
commission an election not to proceed with the alternative form of regulation as
authorized by the commission.").
161. WASH. REV. CODE 80.36.135(2) (1990).
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approving it. Again, the Washington statute is a good model:
The Commission may approve the plan or modified plan and
authorize its implementation, if it finds, after notice and
hearing, that the plan or modified plan:
(a) Is in the public interest;
(b) Is necessary to respond to such changes in technology and
the structure of the intrastate telecommunications industry
as are in fact occurring;
(c) Is better suited to achieving [public interest goals] than the
traditional rate of return, rate base regulation;
(d) Ensures that ratepayers will benefit from any efficiency
gains and cost savings arising out of the regulatory change
and will afford ratepayers the opportunity to benefit from
improvements in productivity due to technological change;
(e) Will not result in a degradation of the quality or availability of efficient telecommunications services;
(f) Will produce fair, just, and reasonable rates for telecommunications services; and
(g) Will not unduly or unreasonably prejudice or disadvantage
any particular customer class. 62
ALLOCATING COMMON COSTS

There is no easy answer to this problem. Some method must be
found which both permits regulated telephone companies to compete
on a "level playing field" with its competitors and prevents noncompetitive ratepayers from paying more than their fair share of common
costs.

The best solution for the cost-allocation problem would be price
regulation for noncompetitive services. If the initial rates for noncompetitive services under price regulation were set at existing levels, cost
allocation would not have to be done at all. The new telephone law
should authorize the Commission to forgo cost allocation if price
regulation is adopted.
If traditional rate-of-return regulation is retained or revenue
sharing is adopted, a cost allocation will have to be done, because
the only way to measure accurately the rate of return a telephone
company is earning from noncompetitive services is to know the cost
of providing noncompetitive services. However, if competitive service
revenues remain in regulated accounts, the allocation need not be too
162.

WASH. REv. CODE

80.36.135(3) (1991).
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accurate and should err on the side of an underallocation, because
competitive service revenues are available to keep noncompetitive
service rates reasonable and compensate for any cross-subsidization
of competitive services caused by an underallocation. Where competitive service revenues remain regulated, the new telephone law should
authorize the Commission to implement a simple, objective, and
inexpensive cost-allocation methodology aimed at maximizing competitive service revenues above long-run marginal cost. One such
simple methodology would be to use revenue as a proxy for cost. For
example, if a telephone company got 10 percent of its revenue from
competitive services, 10 percent of common costs would be allocated
to competitive services. 63 Lastly, in order to maximize competitive
service market share and revenues above long-run marginal cost, the
Commission should be authorized to allocate common costs to competitive services as a group.
If competitive service revenues are deregulated, cost allocation
must be taken more seriously, and revenue proxies will not do. The
new telephone law should require the Commission to implement a
cost-allocation methodology based on cost, as expensive an administrative process as that may be.'6

163. For example, Idaho has a statute that requires its public service commission
to devise a means for preventing cross-subsidization that "reasonably reflect[s] how
joint-use facilities are utilized" and "minimize[s] the cost of accounting and record
keeping to the extent possible." IDAHO CODE § 61-622A (West Supp. 1991). Pursuant
to this statute, the Idaho Public Service Commission rejected the idea of conducting
an arbitrary cost allocation proceeding and instead devised a plan which allocates a
portion of increased revenue (which is easy to measure objectively) to noncompetitive
services. In re Application of U S West Communications for a Rate Reduction and
Approval of a Revenue Sharing Plan for Compliance with the Cost Allocation
Provisions of Idaho Code 61-622A, Case No. MTB-T-88-13, Order No. 22738, at 815 (Idaho PUC, September 21, 1989). The Idaho Commission recently renewed the
plan, finding that it is a "reasonable alternative to traditional cost allocation
procedures" and noting that the Commission Staff had concluded that a revenue
proxy was "easier and less costly to administer." In re Commission Staff Evaluation
of U S West Communications' Idaho Revenue Sharing Plan, Case No. MTB-T-90-3,
Order No. 23531, at 8-10 (Idaho PSC, January 22, 1991).
164. Two such cost-based methodologies are historical cost causation (i.e.,
investments originally made solely for the provisioning of one type of service-

noncompetitive or competitive-but which later were utilized for both types of
services) and relative usage (i.e., the ratio between the amount of time common
facilities are used for noncompetitive services and the amount of time they are used
for competitive services).
Prior to adopting price regulation for AT&T, the FCC was very serious about cost
allocation and insisted on a cost-based methodology. In 1976, the FCC adopted a
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In order to promote competition, the new telephone law should
authorize the Commission to allocate common costs to deregulated
competitive services as a group in order to allow regulated telephone
companies the pricing flexibility necessary to respond to market
conditions and compete on a level playing field with their unregulated
competitors.
DEREGULATION OF COMPETITIVE SERVICE REVENUES

The new telephone law should authorize the Commission to
deregulate completely the revenues of truly competitive services provided that the telephone company has permitted competitors to interconnect with the telephone company's monopoly network on reasonable
terms. Telephone companies should be required to offer interconnection at rates equal to cost. In return, competitors should be required
to pay a reasonable "contribution element" in order to help pay for
regulatory costs.
While the current definition of a "competitive telecommunications service" in Section 209 of the Act may be adequate to qualify
a service for flexible pricing, MFS is correct that the definition is
inadequate to qualify a service's revenues for complete deregulation.
The new telephone law should require the Commission to consider
many factors before qualifying a service's revenues for complete
deregulation. Colorado's deregulation statute would be a good model:
In determining whether effective competition for a specific telecommunications service exists, the commission shall make findings, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, and shall issue an order based
historical cost causation approach for AT&T. See Telpak, supra note 24, at 1215.
[In 1980, the FCC decided to allow MCI to use a current usage approach because of

MCI's lack of historical cost data.] See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. F.C.C.,

675 F.2d 408, 413-15 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
In 1987, the FCC adopted a three-tier hierarchy of cost-based methodologies: (1)
whenever possible, historical cost causation should be used; (2) when historical cost
causation is impossible, relative usage should be used; and (3) when relative usage is

impossible, the ratio of costs directly attributable to noncompetitive services and
costs directly attributable to competitive services should be used. See Cost
Allocation Plan, supra note 132, at paragraph 161.

The third of these cost-based methodologies is relatively inexpensive and commonly used by public utility companies. See 1 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMics OF
REGULATION at 78 n. 36 (2d ed. 1988) ("Companies often allocate various common
overhead costs in proportion to the variable costs that can be directly attributed to
the individual products."). The Illinois Commerce Commission recently adopted this
third cost-based methodology for Illinois Bell. See, Remand Order, supra note 133,
at 202.
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upon consideration of the following factors as the commission deems
applicable in particular cases:
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)

The extent of economic, technological, or other barriers
to market entry and exit;
The number of other providers offering similar services;
The ability of consumers to obtain the service from other
providers at reasonable and comparable rates, on comparable terms, and under comparable conditions;
The ability of any provider of such telecommunications
service to affect prices or deter competition;
Such other relevant and necessary factors, including but
not limited to relevant geographic areas, as the commis1 65
sion deems appropriate.
EPILOGUE

In 1985, Illinois moved into the forefront of state legislative
efforts to recognize the increasingly competitive telecommunications
marketplace. Over the past several years, many other states have
moved ahead of Illinois by authorizing their public service commissions to adopt alternative regulation for noncompetitive services and
deregulation of truly competitive services. Provided adequate safeguards are in place, adopting the forward-looking regulatory reforms
seen in other states should be a win-win situation for regulated
telephone companies, its competitors, and their ratepayers.

165. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-15-305(I)(b) (1984).

